REPEAL OF A STATUTE :

REPEAL OF A STATUTE :

A power to make a law with respect to the topics committed to parliament or state

legislature carries with it a power to repeal a law on those topics. Subject to any constitutional

restriction, the general rule is that “the power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co-extensive

with its power to enact such a law,” and a legislature which has no power to enact a law on a

particular subject-matter has also no power to repeal the same. If parliament chooses, in a

subsequent act, to make it perfectly plain that the previous one is being to some extent repealed

or abrogated, that must have effect, because it is the will of the legislature.

An act, therefore, may be repealed by a later “distinct and repealing enactment or an

enactment inconsistent and irreconcilable therewith”. In other words no repeal can be brought

about “unless there is an express repeal of an earlier act by the later act, or unless the two acts

cannot stand together”. A repeal may thus be by express words of a later statute, or may be

implied on considerations of inconsistency, or irreconcilability of the provisions of an earlier

statute, with those of a later statute. A power ‘to amend or repeal’ will, therefore, imply a power

to amend or repeal by implication, i.e., by making inconsistent laws.

Repeal by implication – A repeal by implication takes place when (a) the subsequent act

is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that one of the two can remain in

force or (b) an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be substituted.

The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the last expression of the legislative

will should prevail.

It is a well recognized principle of interpretation of statutes that an enactment or rule

having the force of law cannot be held to be repealed by implication by a later enactment or

statutory rule unless the provisions of the earlier enactment or rule are plainly repugnant to

those of the subsequent enactment or rule and the entire subject-matter of the first is taken by

the subsequent enactment. Repeal by implication is the consequent of contradictory or

inconsistent legislation and should not be imputed to legislation or rule making authority unless

one is driven to do so. Where a later enactment or a subordinate legislation is so inconsistent

with or repugnant to an earlier enactment or subordinate legislation that the two cannot co exist,

then the latter one would effect repeal of the former by implication (Dharan Gadhara Chemical

Works v. Dhardngadhra Municipality and Another (1985 4 S.C.C. 91).

The general rule is that the repealing act are unless the contrary intention appears, (i)

not to affect the previous operation of any enactments so repealed or anything duly done under

any enactment so repealed (ii) not to affect any privilege, right, obligation or liability acquired,

accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or (iii) not to affect any penalty, for failure

or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed”

or (iv) not to effect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,

privilege, obligation; liability, penalty of forfeiture aforesaid.

The repeal of any act does not necessarily result in the repeal of the rules. The rules and

regulations do not lose their character as rules and regulations, even though they are to be of

the same effect as if contained in the act.

The general rule of repeal that when a parent act is repealed, all laws made thereunder

stand repealed does not apply to laws made under a constitution act, such a law has to be

expressly repealed. It has to be effected. In the case of subordinate legislation, the emanating

law dies unless saved, but a new law made under a constitution act survives will expressly

repealed.

COMMENCEMENT OF A STATUTE

COMMENCEMENT OF A STATUTE :

Commencement, used with reference of an act, means the day on which the act comes

into force. Unless provided otherwise, a central act comes into operation on the day it receives

the Presidential assent and is construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration

of the day preceding its commencement. Thus, if a central act is assented to by the President

on 26th January at 10.30 a.m., it would be construed to have come into operation on the mid-

night between 25th and 26th January.

Under the various state general clauses acts a state act comes into force on the day

when the assent of the Governor or the President, as the case may be, is first published in the

Official Gazette of the state.

An act cannot be said to commence or to be in force unless it is brought into operation

by legislative enactment or by the exercise of authority by a delegate empowered to bring it into

operation.

An act not applicable to an area or a state cannot be made to apply there by judicial fiat

but if a provision in such an act embodies a principle of justice, equity or good conscience the

principle so embodied may be applied to a case arising from an area or state to which the act

does not extend, if the fact situation of the case so requires.

EXPRESIO UNIUS EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

EXPRESIO UNIUS EXCLUSION ALTERIUS :

Meaning and its application:- This maxim means that mention of one or more things of a

particular class may be regarded as excluding all other members of that class. Further more,

when an act used two words, one of which includes the other, the more general one would

naturally exclude the less general one.

An illustration of the application of this maxim in an Indian case may be cited. In

considering the applicability of the maxim to sections 68 and 87 of the Bombay District

Municipality, it was observed by the HC of Bombay that the rule is not of universal application

and it cannot be applied unless the statute by its language shows all things different in genus

and description from those which are enumerated are intended to be excluded. When the act

gives general powers to the Municipality to fix the amount or rate at which it desires to make the

class or classes of persons or property habile: it is not proper to suggest that, because some

specific instances are enumerated wherein it is said that the municipality can impose rates upon

certain basis, such enumeration has the effect of limiting municipality’s choice of the basis upon

which the taxes can be levied. It was accordingly held that eh aforesaid sections were not

intended to deal only with the tax specified in section 59 9a) (i) of the act, but covered also any

other tax which was imposed in the form of a rate on buildings or lands (Shidrao v. municipality

of Athni, A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 21.)

The gist of the decision on the case is that this rule has no application where it would

lead to inconsistency and injustice and would make the provision of the statute in question

uncertain and capricious in its operation.

REDDENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS

REDDENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS:

The rule may be stated from an Irish case in the following words: “where there are

general words of description, following an enumeration of particular things such general words

are to be construed distributively, reddendo singular singulis; and if the general words will apply

to some things and not to others the general words are to be applied to those things to which

they will, and not to these to which they will not apply; that rule is beyond all controversy”. Thus,

‘I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A’ will be construed, reddendo

singular singulis by applying ‘devise’ to ‘real’ property and ‘bequeath’ to ‘personal’ property, and

in the sentence; ‘If any one shall draw or load any sword or gun’ the word ‘draw’ is applied to

‘sword’ only and the word ‘load’ to ‘gun’ only, because it is impossible to load a sword or draw a

Another example of the application of the rule is found in the construction of the proviso

to article 304 of the constitution which reads: ‘provided that no bill or amendment for the

purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a state without the

previous sanction of the President’. It was held by the supreme Court that the word ‘introduced’

referred to ‘Bill’ and the word ‘moved’ to Amendment’.

RULE OF EJUSDEM OF GENERIS

RULE OF EJUSDEM OF GENERIS :

When particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general

words, the general words are construed as limited things of the same kind as those specified.

This rule which is known as the rule of ejusdem generis reflects an attempt “to reconcile

incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of the other rules of interpretation

that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole

and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous.

By application of this rule the words ‘any other goods’ occurring in Section 43 of the

Customs (Consolidation) Act, 1876 which empowered His Majesty by order in Council to prohibit

the importation of ‘arms, ammunition, or gum power or any other goods’ were construed as

referring to goods similar to ‘arms, ammunition or gun power’.

On the same principles the Privy Council held that the words, ‘any other sufficient

reason’ occurring in Rule 1 of Order 47, Civil Procedure Code 1908, must be taken as meaning

a reason sufficient on the grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously,

and similarly the phrase ‘further and other relief’ occurring in section 92(1)(h) of the code was

held by the privy council to mean relief of the same nature as specified in clauses (a) to (g) of

the same section.

It is essential for application of the ejusdem generis rule that enumerated things before

the general words must constitute a category or a genus or a family which admits of a number

of species or members.

If the preceding words do not constitute mere specifications of a genus but constitute

description of a complete genus, the rule has no application. In a policy of insurance, the

insurers were given an option to terminate the policy if they so desired ‘by reason of such

change or from any other cause whatever; the words ‘by reason of such change’ in the context

referred to any and every act done to the insured property whereby the risk of fire was

increased; the privy council in these circumstances refused to construe the words ‘or from any

other cause whatever’ by the rule of ejusdem generis.

The rule of ejusdem generis has to be applied with care and caution. It is not an

inviolable rule of law, but it is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the

contrary, and where context and object and mischief of the enactment do not require restricted

meaning to be attached to words of general import, it becomes the duty of the courts to give

those words their plain and ordinary meaning.