Thursday, September 24, 2015

PARLIAMENTARY SPECIAL RIGHT IN UK

 INTERNATIONAL PROSPECTIVE
                                                        UNITED KINGDOM:

CONCEPT OF STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN PUBLIC LIFE AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN UK:
Bribery and corruption are extremely serious offences, which strike at the heart of public confidence in administrative and judicial affairs. This factor alone will weigh heavily when considering the public interest in prosecuting and a prosecution will be expected unless exceptional factors apply.
Halbury’s laws of England[1] states the law as under:

“Members of Parliament-Except in relation to anything that is said in debate, a Member of the House of Lords or of the House of Commons, is subject to the ordinary course of criminal justice; the privilege of Parliament does not apply to criminal matters.”

Bribery of Members of Parliament according to May’s Parliamentary Practice is treated as a breach of privilege and contempt of Parliament[2].  According to most of the writers on English Law, bribery of Members of Parliament though not a statutory offence at the Common law[3].

THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACTS IN UNITED KINGDOM:
In addition to common law offences corruption offences are found in at least 12 statutes: The main statutes are the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 as supplemented by the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (which extends jurisdiction to overseas corruption). Other relevant statues are the Sale of Offices Act 1551; Sale of Offices Act 1809, Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925; Licensing Act 1964; Criminal Law Act 1967; Local Government Act 1972; Customs and Excise Management Act 1979; Representation of the People Act 1983;
The main statutes dealing with corruption are as follows:
1.      THE PUBLIC BODIES CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1889:
Section 1(1) of the 1889 Act makes it an offence for any person alone, or in conjunction with others, to corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive, for him/herself, or for any other person, any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage whatever as an inducement to, or reward for, or otherwise on account of any member, officer, or servant of a public body, doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which the public body is concerned.
Section 1(2) of the 1889 Act[4] creates a similar offence to that of section 1(1) above, in respect of anyone who corruptly gives promises or offers any gift, etc.
The definition of a public body is contained in section 7 of the 1889 Act. This definition was amended and extended by section 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 to apply to local and public authorities of all descriptions. However, this definition does not include a government department or the Crown[5], so corruption involving those persons should be charged under the 1906 Act, see below.
Corruptly in the 1889 Act does not mean dishonestly but means purposely doing an act which the law forbids as tending to corrupt[6]. Corrupt has not been defined in law.


2.      THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1906:
The 1906 Act is very broadly worded; it makes it a crime to bribe any agent. An agent is anybody employed by or acting for another, whether in the public or private sector. Section 1 of the 1906 Act also creates offences relating to other corrupt transactions by and with agents in relation to their principals activities, including making false statements or knowingly giving false documents to an agent, intending to mislead their principal.
Agent in the 1906 Act includes Crown Servants, but does not include councilors in local government, so those cases should be dealt with under the 1889 Act. Corruptly in the 1906 Act does not mean dishonestly but means a deliberate offering of money or other favors, with the intention to corrupt.
The prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant actually demonstrated favor as a consequence of having received the gift, as long as he received the gift as an inducement to show favor. Offences under the 1906 Act require the consent of the Attorney General
3.      THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1916
In 1916 the presumption of corruption was introduced. This means if a person gives a gift to any employee of the Crown, a government department or a public body, and that person or their principal holds or seeks to obtain a contract from the Crown, a government department, or a public body, that gift shall be presumed to be corrupt unless the accused person can prove otherwise. This represents a reversal of the burden of proof.
The Government has indicated that this law will be repealed when the law is reformed. The presumption does not apply to anything which is only an offence due to the provisions on overseas corruption within the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.


4.      ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001
Part 12 of the ATCSA came into force on 14 February 2002, thus cases where all elements of the criminality take place overseas can only be prosecuted in the UK if a relevant event took place after that date. If all elements of the alleged criminality took place before that date, a prosecution can still be considered, provided: (a) that some part of the crime took place in the UK; OR (b) that the offender was a UK national in the service of the Crown (see section 31 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948.)
The ATCSA also lifted restrictions on the sharing of information by the tax and customs authorities in support of criminal investigations or proceedings. Amendments to the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, which came into force in July 2002, provide that payments made outside the UK which would have constituted a criminal offence if made within the UK will not be deductible for tax purposes.
Part 12 of the Act of 2001, section 108 clarifies that the existing offences of bribery and corruption apply to the bribery of foreign public office holders, including foreign MPs, judges, ministers and 'agents' (as defined by the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906). It amends the Act of 1889[7], the Act of 1906[8] and the Act of 1916[9] to ensure that the corruption offences in the 1889 and 1906 Acts cover (respectively) the corruption of foreign public officials and foreign agents in the public or private sector.
Section 109 of the Act is a free-standing provision which gives the courts in England, Wales and Northern Ireland extra-territorial jurisdiction over bribery and corruption offences committed abroad by UK nationals and/or bodies incorporated under UK law. The relevant offences are (a) the common law offence of bribery; (b) the offences under section 2 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889; and (c) the first two offences under section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. It thus enables bribery offences, when committed by UK nationals and bodies incorporated under UK law, to be prosecuted in the UK, wherever those offences take place. Section 109 applies not only to companies but also, for example, to limited partnerships. It does not apply to unincorporated bodies.
A company can also be held criminally liable if it can be shown to have authorised, directed or actively connived in an act of bribery by any of its overseas subsidiaries. This is by virtue of the laws of incitement and conspiracy. This would include, for example, directing a subsidiary to pay a bribe or providing the necessary funds to a subsidiary, knowing that they were to be used for a bribe.

CONTRIBUTION OF NOLAN COMMITTEE, 1995

Lord Nolan’s recommendations were discussed in Hansard and most of them were accepted by the Government. The recommendations, inter alia, suggested appointment of Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards; establishment of a new Select Committee on Standard’s and Privileges; introduction of a Code of Conduct; and a review of wording of the 1947 Resolutions. The Second Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life said: “The main source of public anxiety, as indentified by Lord Nolan, is the notion that influence, whether real or imagined, can be bought and sold through Members.  This suggested that any remedial action, rather than seeking to draw a line of legitimacy between different types of outside bodies with which members should or should not be allowed to have paid relationships, ought to concentrate on defining as closely as possible as those actions by members which, because they give rise to suggestion about the exercise – or attempted exercise – of proper influence, need to be prohibited”
Parliament Select Committee Resolution of 1858

The Select Committee observed that “In 1858, the House resolved that it is contrary to the usage and derogatory to the dignity of this House any of its Members should bring forward, promote or advocate in this House any proceeding or measure in which he may have acted or being concerned for or consideration of any pecuniary fees or reward, a prohibition originally directed particularly at Members who were practicing barristers. Our report is based on three- pronged approach:
-          prohibition on paid advocacy in Parliament;
-          strict regulation governing paid advance; and
-          transparency in all payments related to parliament.
It will be one of the key functions of the Parliamentary Commissioners for the Standards and of the new Select Committee on Standards and Privileges to provide detail guidelines as cases of doubt arise.

RESOLUTION OF 1947 ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MP’S CONDUCT:

The Committee examined the Resolution of 1947, as it existed then. It reads as follows: “that it is inconsistent with the dignity of the House, with the duty of the Member of the House to enter into any contractual agreement with an outside body, controlling or limiting Members complete independence and freedom of action of Parliament or stipulating that he shall act in any way as the representative of such outside body in regard to any matter to be translated in Parliament; the duty of the Member being to his constituency and to the country as a whole, rather than any particular action thereof”.

The resolution represented a concise statement of basic principle but it did not indicate the specific kinds of Parliamentary actions which ought not to be undertaken for the payments, on behalf of outside bodied, whether or not they form subject of formal arrangement. After deliberation, the Select Committee recommended that the House be asked to agree to the following addendum to the 1947 Resolution: “and that in particular no Member of this House shall, in consideration of any remuneration, fee, payment, reward or benefit in kind, direct or indirect, which Member of any member of his or her family has received, is receiving or expects to receive:
i.                    advocate or initiate ant cause or matter on behalf of an outside body or individual, or
ii.                  urge any other Member of either House of Parliament, including Ministers to show, by means of any Speech, Questions, Motion, introduction of a Bill or Amendment to a Motion or a Bill.”

ROYALE COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN PUBLIC LIFE:

Lord Simon, as Chairman of the Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life, in his report in July 1976, recommended in para 311 thereof as follows:
Member of Parliament is a great honour and carries with it a special duty to maintain the highest standards of probity, and this duty has almost invariably been strictly observed. Never the less in view of our report as a whole, and especially in the light of the point set out in foregoing paragraph, we recommend that Parliament should consider bringing corruption, bribery and attempted bribery of a Member of Parliament acting in Parliamentary capacity within the ambit of criminal law. Lord Nolan also recommended that there is need to clarify the legal position whether statutory offence of bribery and corruption applies to the Members of Parliament.

U K NEIL HAMILTON CASE:

In 1994, Neil Hamilton, Minister of Corporate Affairs, had to resign in the wake of a news paper report, published in The Guardian that he and another Member of Parliament (Mr Smith) accepted payments for tabling parliamentary questions. The cash for questions became a matter of wide public debate in John’s Major tenures as Prime Minister.
While Smith admitted the allegations, Neil Hamilton and a lobbyist, Ian Greer filled a case for libel against The Guardian.  The defence of the newspapers was that they would be prevented from justifying their allegations because of Article IX of the Bill of Rights which guarantees freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament. The Court stayed the proceedings acting on the past precedents. In a mean time, a Bill for procedural amendments to the law of deformation was pending. It was suggested, it might be used to waiver the permit of Article IX and as amendment was made allowing such a waiver. However Neil Hamilton withdrew his suit and faced an investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioners for Standards.             
        
CORRUPTION BILL (2002–03)

PROSECUTING MP’S AND PEERS FOR CORRUPTION:

The draft Bill intends that Members of Parliament and peers should be subject to the same corruption law as everyone else. We support this objective. No witness argued that MPs and peers should be immune from the corruption laws. The Standards and Privileges Committee of the House of Commons, the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords and the (Wicks) Committee on Standards in Public life support the proposal[10]. Corruption in Parliament has not wholly escaped punishment in the past. Indeed Members have been punished by expulsion for accepting bribes since at least 1667[11]. The leading authority on parliamentary procedure, Erskine May, says: “The acceptance by a Member of either House of a bribe to influence him in his conduct as a Member, or of any fee, compensation or reward in connection with the promotion of or opposition to any Bill, resolution, matter or thing submitted or intended to be submitted to the House or to a committee is a contempt. Any person who is found to have offered such a corrupt consideration is also in contempt[12]”.

We understand that the exclusion of MPs from the statutory offences of corruption is a result of historical accident rather than deliberate policy. This is because the statutory offences have been interpreted to mean that neither House is a public body for the purposes of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 nor a Member of Parliament is not an agent for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.

In 1992 one Member of Parliament was prosecuted for the common law offence of bribery. The judge ruled that MPs were subject to the common law offence[13]. In that case it was alleged that the MP accepted bribes from a company in his constituency “to show such favour as might be within his power as a member of Parliament” to the company and its directors in relation to their business and contracts with British Rail. The case never came to a full trial because in a separate trial of the company executives the judge ruled that there was no case to answer and the Crown later offered no evidence against the MP. The Committee has received little evidence that any MPs and peers have avoided prosecution for corruption either because of their status or because parliamentary proceedings cannot be questioned in court[14].

As the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privileges noted in 1999, “there are very few instances of corruption involving Members of Parliament”[15]. The Attorney General could not identify any occasions in which MPs or peers have escaped prosecution because of the provisions of Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689[16]. We have been told there have been very few cases in other comparable jurisdictions[17]. The draft Bill does not explicitly mention MPs and peers but its intention and effect are clearly to include them within the new corruption offences. This is the case irrespective of whether Clause 12 is in the Bill.

The purpose of Clause 12 is to remove any evidential difficulty in prosecuting MPs and peers. We understand that in many situations MPs and peers could be prosecuted for corruption without any evidence of proceedings in Parliament being adduced in court. Nonetheless there may be circumstances in which a conviction could not be obtained without such evidence. The 1999 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege expected that there would be few prosecutions of Members for corruption and that in only a small proportion of such cases would it be necessary to question proceedings in Parliament[18].

The Attorney General and Director of Public Prosecutions, respectively, told us: “I think there would be cases where without Clause 12 it would not be possible to bring a prosecution because evidence of a key ingredient of the offence would not otherwise be available[19]”.

On the issue whether Clause 12 is necessary, we refer below to Australian and American cases. The Clerk of the House of Commons told us: “It can .... be argued that the fundamental requirement for the successful prosecution of the proposed new criminal offence of corruption will be clear evidence of the existence of a corrupt bargain and that Clause 12 will not materially assist the prosecution in meeting that requirement…..but I accept that some hypothetical cases of corruption by Members of Parliament would be, at least, extremely difficult to prosecute as criminal offences without encroaching on the Bill of Rights[20]”.

There is experience of legislators being prosecuted in other countries without impinging on freedom of speech in Parliament. We were told that in Australia, evidence of parliamentary proceedings could be cited in court as long as the participants in those proceedings were not exposed to criminal liability[21]. In several instances Members have been prosecuted for corruption-type offences without reference to parliamentary proceedings and without it being thought that the prosecution was hampered thereby[22]. In the United States of America, convictions of legislators for corruption have been obtained by concentrating on the improper agreement to do something rather than on the act which was done as part of proceedings in
Congress[23].In both countries the development in the law has resulted from the decisions of courts in actual cases; in Australia this has led to Parliament enacting a statutory definition of parliamentary proceedings.

THE COMMON LAW OFFENCE OF BRIBERY:
Bribery and attempted bribery (i.e. where there is an offer to bribe, even if the offer is not taken up) are common law offences punishable by imprisonment or a fine at large, or both.
The formulation of the offence is broad. The scope is best summarised in the case of R v. Whitaker[24]  which states that the common law offence of bribery is committed when a bribe is given or offered to induce a public official to fail to act in accordance with his duty.
In the case of R v. Gurney[25]  the mental element was held to include an intention to produce any effect at all on the decision of a public officer.
The category of persons who may be bribed is extensive, including a person who is tasked with carrying out a public duty, for example, a jury member, a coroner and a member of the armed forces. The offence of bribery is also committed by the person who receives the bribe. Receipt of the bribe can also be charged as the common-law offence of misfeasance in public office. 
Case law suggests that entertainment and treats when of small value are not prohibited because they cannot be regarded as having been conferred in order to influence a person, or incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity[26].
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORRUPTION LAW:
In March 2003 the Government, in an attempt to consolidate and clarify the law on bribery, published a draft Corruption Bill for pre-legislative scrutiny, based on a scheme put forward by the Law Commission. The Bill was subject to severe criticism and has not been introduced to Parliament. The Law Commission has been tasked to produce a new draft which will be published in due course.




[1] Vol. II (1) para 37 at page 40.
[2] 21St.Edn. Page 128.
[3] See for relevant discussion in paragraphs 9-11 in the judgment.
[4] The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889.
[5] R v Naci Vedat Natji, 2002 EWCA Crim 271.
[6] Cooper v Slade, (1851).
[7] Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1989.
[8] Prevention of Corruption, 1906.
[9] Prevention of Corruption, 1916.
[10] Ev 172 DCB 35; Ev 158 DCB 24; Ev 157 DCB 23 para 8.
[11] For a recent account of the history see Oliver & Drewry in Conduct Unbecoming Ch 6 Parliament and the Law relating to Parliamentary Standards.
[12] Erskine May, 22nd edn., Butterworths, 1997, p. 112
[13] R V Greenway. See Public Law April 1998.
[14] Q233 (Sir William McKay).
[15] Ibid Para 140.
[16] Q 547 (Lord Gold Smith).
[17] Q 260 (Sir William McKay).
[18] Ibid para 168.
[19] Q 562 (Lord Gold Smith).
[20] Ev 134 DCB 5 para 10.
[21] Q239 (Sir William McKay).
[22] Ev 132 lines 49 and 50 DCB 2 (Harry Evans).
[23] Q248 (Sir William McKay).
[24] [1914] 3 K.B. 1283.
[25] 10 Cox CC 550.
[26] Woodward v. Maltby, [1959] VR 794.

ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION CASE LAW


 ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION CASE LAW

(1980 – 1990)

ANTUALY CASE[1]:
    
The Antualy case has assumed over seven years in Indian Courts the stature of an epic narration. The judicial disclosure reaffirms the insightful observation of Paul Ricoeur that to “begin with all discourse is produced as an event” and it is “realized as an event but understood as a meaning[2]”.

On 9th June, 1980 Antulay (hereafter called accused) became the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. One Ramdas Nayak (hereafter complainant) on September 1, 1981 applied to the Governor under Section 197, CrPC and Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for sanction to prosecute the appellant. Without waiting for the sanction, the complainant filled a complaint before the Addl. Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned magistrate refused to take cognizance of the offences under Prevention of Corruption Act without sanction for prosecution. Thereafter complaint was filed in the High Court. The High Court rejected the complaint.

In the meantime, another development had taken place which may be briefly noticed. One Shri P.B. Samant, who has also filed an identical complaint against the accused, along with several others filed a Writ Petition No. 1165 of 1981 in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the method of distribution of ad hoc allotment of cement in the State of Maharashtra as being contrary to the rule of law and probity in public life. On January 12, 1982 accused resigned from the post of Chief Minister in deference to the judgment of the Bombay High Court.

On July 28, 1982 Governor granted sanction under Section 197 of Cr PC and Section 6 of Prevention of Corruption Act in respect of 5 items relating to 3 subjects only. The complainant filled a fresh complaint before the Special Judge bringing in more allegations and including those which had been refused. This was challenged by the accused. Special Judge rejected the application by the accused challenging his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.

Special Judge discharged the accused holding that a MLA is a public servant and there was no valid sanction for a public servant. The complainant filled an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. Supreme Court was pleased to hold that an MLA is not a public servant and set aside the order. Instead of remanding the case to the Special Judge for disposal and transferred the same to the Bombay High Court. Accused raised an objection regarding his jurisdiction to try the special cases which could be tried only by Special Judges. The High Court refused to entertain this objection to jurisdiction holding that he was bound by the orders of the Supreme Court.

On the instance of the accused the Supreme Court clarified its decision and dismissed appellants SLP. Court also dismissed writ petition filed under Article 32 by the accused. Further the Supreme Court held that the learned Special Judge was clearly in error in holding that a M.L.A. is a public servant within the meaning of the expression under Section 12(a) and further erred in holding that a sanction of the Legislative Assembly of Maharashtra or majority of the members was a condition precedent to taking cognizance of offences committed by the accused. For the reasons herein stated both the conclusions are wholly unsustainable and must be quashed and set aside.


(1990 – 2000)

JMM BRIBERY CASE:

The facts involved in the Constitution Bench decision in P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State[3] (JMM bribery case) are that in 1991 election to the Lok Sabha, Congress (I) Party remained fourteen members short of the majority and it formed a minority Government with P.V. Narasimha Rao as the Prime Minister.  The said Government had to face a motion of no-confidence on 28.07.1993 and it somehow managed to defeat the motion by mustering the support of 265 members as against 251.  One Revinder Kumar of the Rashtriya Mukti Morcha filed a complaint (FIR) with the “CBI” alleging that a criminal conspiracy was hatched pursuant to which certain members of Parliament belonging to Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and certain others owing allegiance to Janta Dal (Ajit Singh Group) agreed to and did receive bribes from P.V. Narasimha Rao and others to give votes with a view to defeat the no-confidence motion.  A criminal prosecution was launched against the bribe-giving and bribe-taking Members of Parliament under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.   The Special Judge took cognizance of the offence of bribery and criminal conspiracy.  The persons sought to be charged filed petitions at the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings.  The High Court at Delhi dismissed the petitions.

On presentation of appeals by way of special leave and upon reference of the case to a Constitution Bench, the Court formulated for decision these questions:
(i)         Does Article 105 of the Constitution confer any immunity on a Member of Parliament from being prosecuted in a criminal court for an offence involving offer or acceptance of bribe?
(ii)        Is a Member of Parliament excluded from the ambit of the 1988 Act for the reason that:
(a)    he is not a person who can be regarded as “public servant” as defined under Section 2(c) of the 1988 Act, and
(b)   he is not a person comprehended in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 and there is no authority to grant sanction for his prosecution under the 1988 Act?

The Constitution Bench by a majority of three to two answered the first question in the affirmative, except in case of A-15 Ajit Singh (who, unlike the other co-accused did not case his vote on the no-confidence motion), holding that the bribe-taking Members of Parliament who voted on the no-confidence motion are entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution for the offences of bribery and criminal conspiracy conferred on them by Article 105 (2) of the Constitution.  The Court in answer to the second question, ruled that a Member of Parliament is a “public servant” within Section 2(c) of the 1988 Act.  It also concluded that since there is no authority to grant sanction for prosecution of the offending persons for certain offences, they cannot be tried under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for such offences.

The answer given by the majority to the first question seems to have no support of precedents, theory and practice. Article 105(2) confers no immunity on a Member of Parliament involved in a case of bribery. The provisions of Article 105(2) of the Constitution confer immunity on a Member of Parliament from criminal prosecution only in respect of the “freedom of Speech” and the “right to give vote” by him in Parliament or any committee thereof[4].   The immunity or protection is available only in regard to these parliamentary or official activities.  Such immunity is not available for any acts done in his private or personal capacity.  The conduct of a Member of Parliament involving the commission of offences of bribery and criminal conspiracy having been done in personal capacity cannot, on any reasoning, be held to be acts done in the discharge or purported discharge of his parliamentary or official duty in Parliament.  Taking of bribe is obviously a criminal act.

In initiating criminal prosecution of a public servant under the cover of immunity, certain principles have emerged around Section 197 Cr. PC.  In a case of bribery punishable under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code in Gill v. King[5] the Privy Council approving the statement of law in the Federal Court decision in Hori Ram Singh (Dr.) v. Emperor[6] observed:

“A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty.  Thus, a Judge neither acts nor purports to act as a Judge in receiving bribe, the judgment he delivers may be such an act, nor does a Government Medical Officer act or purport to act as a public servant in picking the pocket of a patient whom he is examining, though the examination itself may be such an act.  The test may well be, that when a public servant is challenged, he can reasonably claim that what he does, he does in virtue of his office.”

A Constitution Bench further in Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab[7] agreeing with another Constitution Bench decision in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari[8] and in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepso[9] observed:

“It appears to us to be clear that some offences by their very nature cannot be regarded as having been committed by public servants, while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty.  For instance, acceptance of a bribe is one of them and an offence of cheating and abetment thereof is another ….such offences have no necessary nexus between them and the performance of the duties of a public servant: ‘The official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the commission of such offences[10].””   

The majority in the JMM bribery case thus does not have the support of precedents for holding that the bribe-taking Members of Parliament in receiving a bribe had acted in the discharge of their parliamentary or official duty.

Immunity available only for acts inside Parliament or a Committee:
The immunity under clause (2) of Article 105 from criminal prosecution is available to a Member of Parliament only from any liability arising out of “anything said” or “any vote given” inside Parliament or in any committee thereof.  The clause therefore has absolutely no application to any act of a Member constituting an offence of bribery outside Parliament as to bar his liability for criminal prosecution.  The Constitution Bench in Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy[11] interpreting the expression “in Parliament” and “in the course of the business of Parliament” lends support to it.

Constitution Bench in Jatish Chandra Ghosh (Dr) v. Hari Sadhan Mukherjee[12] has also held that the immunity available to a speech made by a Member inside the legislative chamber of an Assembly under clause (2) of Article 194 (equivalent of Article 105(2)) shall not be available in regard to the same speech when it was got published by a legislator “outside” the four walls of the Legislative Assembly.

It, therefore, follows that the majority in the case under comment could not have extended the immunity to acts to bribery and criminal conspiracy committed by the bribe-giving and bribe-taking Members of Parliament “outside” Parliament by creating an illusory “nexus” with the subsequent act of casting votes by bribe-taking Members inside Parliament subsequently.

The facts of the JMM bribery case disclose that the conduct of the Members of Parliament without the four walls of the House itself alone constituted the completed offences of bribery and conspiracy as per the definition of these offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Penal Code and the same were legally capable of proof dehors the act of casting votes subsequently on the no-confidence motion by the bribe-taking Members in Parliament.  The submission cannot be better supported than by making a reference to the finding of the majority itself in the appeal of A-15 Ajit Singh, who has been ordered to stand trial for bribery and conspiracy only on the basis of his conduct outside the four walls of the Lok Sabha, because unlike the other co-accused, he had not given his vote on the no-confidence motion.

Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, if a bribe is given or taken by a public servant (Member of Parliament) to use his position dishonestly, that is, to favour the briber as opposed to dealing with the matter before him independently on merits, the crime of bribery is complete.  Explanation (d) to Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act[13], shows that the non-proof of these subsequent acts would not render the offence of bribery incomplete.  This provision also establishes the unessential nature of the nexus or connection if any, between the criminal act outside and the act of casting vote inside Parliament.  Besides, any prior assurance of giving a favourable vote inside Parliament is neither an ingredient of the crime nor a “material fact” in a pleading necessary to complete the picture of the “cause of action” to prove the crime of bribery in a criminal court.  Therefore, the finding of the majority that the crime “is in respect of” the vote cast on the no-confidence motion and a proof of the goings-on in Parliament is necessary at the trial, has no basis to stand upon.

The court proceedings that fall within the ambit of clause (2) of Article 105 can be only those which “arise out of” and are subsequent to “anything said” or “any vote given” in Parliament or any committee thereof and not those which arose from outside antecedent conduct of the Members of Parliament.
           
The criminal liability that has arisen in the JMM bribery case, is in relation to the conduct of the Members of Parliament that “preceded” the “giving of votes” by them on the no-confidence motion, which could not be held by the majority to have arisen from the subsequent act of casting votes. In fact the said liability in the context of the Prevention of Corruption Act can be said to have arisen independently of the votes cast.

Besides, the subject-matter of the case, the nature of the proceedings and the kind of the court which is dealing with its shows that it is a criminal proceeding involving an offence of bribery which will result either in the acquittal or conviction and sentence of the bribe-taking Members of Parliament.  Had it been a proceeding “in respect of” votes that were case then it would have been a civil proceeding impeaching the validity of the votes cast on the no-confidence motion. An instance of a civil proceeding “in respect of” votes given is available in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kilbourn v. Thompson[14]. The other illustration of a court proceeding that may fall within the scope of clause (2) of Article 105 is the one of the Constitution Bench decision in T. K. Jain v. Sanjiva Reddy[15]. Some persons who held the Sankaracharya in high esteem had in that case filed a suit for damages for defamatory statements made certain Members of Parliament inside the Chamber of Parliament.  Another example in relation to clause (2) of Article 194 is also available in the Constitution Bench decision in Dr. Jatish Chandra Ghosh v. Hari Sadhan Mukherjee[16] already noticed.
           
It is noteworthy that clause (2) of Article 105 is, in terms, limited to only those proceedings that impugn “anything said”, that is, “any speech made” and “any vote given” in Parliament or any committee thereof.  Thus, the findings in the JMM bribery case that the criminal court proceedings were “in respect of” the “votes given” which conferred the immunity on Members of Parliament seems incorrect.  Besides, if the Constituent Assembly had intended to confer absolute immunity under clause (2) in respect of the liability that may arise from any criminal proceedings then it would have been on the pattern of clauses (2) and (3) of Article 361[17] in respect of the President of India and Governors of States.

Minority in JMM bribery case looking into the object of conferring the immunity has relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in the Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India[18]  and has observed that:

“An interpretation of the provisions of Article 105(2), which would enable a Member of Parliament to claim immunity from prosecution for an offence of bribery in connection with anything said or vote given by him in Parliament and thereby placing such Members above the law, would not only be repugnant to the healthy functioning of parliamentary democracy but also will be subversive of the “rule of law”, which is also an essential part of the basic structure of the Constitution”.

It is interesting to note that the law on the point is the same in the USA Chief Justice Burger US v. Brewster observed:

“The Speech bate Clause has to be read broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the legislative branch.  But its purpose was not to make members ‘super-citizens’ immune from criminal liability.  The purpose of the clause was to protect the individual member not simply for his own sake, but to preserve the legislative integrity of the legislative process, but the shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process.  Financial abuses by way of bribes, perhaps even more than ‘executive power’, would grossly undermine legislative integrity and defeat the right of the public to honest representation.”

Lord Salmon who chaired in 1976 the Royal Commission “On Standards of Conduct in Public Life”, spoke in the House of Lords in respect of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1688 thus:
           
“Now this is a charter for freedom of speech in the House, it is not a charter for corruption…..”

CONCLUSION:

Article 105(2) confers immunity on Members of Parliament when they discharge or purport to discharge their parliamentary or official duty of “making of speech” or “giving of votes” in Parliament or any committee thereof. The act of receiving a bribe by a Member is not in pursuance of his parliamentary or official duty aforesaid; the official status of a Member of Parliament merely furnished the occasion or opportunity for the commission of an offence of bribery and bribe-taking Members in the case under comment are not entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution.

The immunity under clause (2) of Article 105 becomes available to a Member when he “makes a speech” or “gives his vote” in the parliamentary proceedings inside one of the Chambers of Parliament or in any committee thereof. Since the acts involving conspiracy and acceptance of bribe were wholly done by the accused outside the four walls of the legislative Chamber, it did not attract the immunity provision so as to protect them from criminal prosecution.  Besides, these criminal acts themselves constitute completed crimes without reference to any goings on in of any proof or disproof of casting of vote by a Member in Parliament.  Therefore, such offences could not be deemed to be acts “in respect of’ the act of “giving of vote” inside Parliament.

Article 105(2) may give immunity from liability arising out of private criminal offences involving defamation, libel or slander but confers no immunity from criminal prosecution for “public offences” , that is, offence against the King or State.  Obviously, no King or State can be expected to confer such immunity which in all probabilities will lead to the destruction of the kingdom or State.  This position is also evident from the non-applicability of the privilege of “freedom from arrest” of the Members of the House of Commons in England to criminal matters, which also remains the legal position under clause (3) of Article 105, its application being “limited to civil causes”.

An interpretation of clause (2), which would enable a Member to claim immunity from prosecution for an offence of bribery, a selfish, vile and depraved act, would not only be repugnant to the healthy development of democratic institutions provided for in the Constitution, but would be subversive of the Constitution itself.  The majority in the case under comment was not at all expected to give a construction of the Constitution involving such dire consequences.

The Constitution is an organic document and the court should have looked at the functioning of the Constitution as a whole.  The constitution in order to maintain the highest standard of probity in public life and to keep parliamentary life unsullied, has provided detailed qualifications and disqualifications for being chosen or being Member of Parliament, including taking an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and excluding persons from the election, convicted of crimes or disqualified for committing corrupt practices at an election or dismissed from public service for corruption and disloyalty or persons holding office of profit under the Government, or defecting from one political party to another.  Even an independent member is made to lose his seat for joining a political party.  In Braj Raj Singh Tiwari, Re[19]and others in the very first case of incurring disqualification in 1952 before the Chief Election Commission, no fewer than twelve members of the Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly lost their seats under Articles 191-192 merely for the receipt of rupees five for every meeting of the District Advisory Committees for not being able to prove “out-of-pocket expenses” equivalent to the compensatory amount paid.

When the Constituent Assembly did not consider it necessary even in the interest of an independence judiciary to afford some protection to the Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts, even though the High Court Judges at one time had enjoyed such protection under the provisions of 13 Geo. III, Chapter 63, Sections 17 and 39 along with the Governor General etc. from trial in criminal cases by Indian courts, there could be no question of the Constituent Assembly giving immunity claimed by bribe-taking Members of Parliament under clause (2) of Article 105.

The Founding Fathers, most of whom had participated in the national freedom struggle and who abolished all titles, dignities, powers, privileges and immunities enjoyed by the erstwhile Rulers of the Indian States, and other feudal elements, and were fired with great ideals, could not possibly declare Members of Parliament and of the Legislatures of the States “super-citizens”.  They could never make provisions in the Constitution to condone the commission of offences against the State including offences of bribery and corruption.

The decision of the majority, it is submitted with respect, is in serious discord with the letter, the ideals, and aspirations of the Constitution while the minority opinion is in harmony with them.  The reasoning of the minority also coincides with the present national outcry against politicians with dubious, criminally tainted records and the wish of ordinary people to keep such persons out of legislative chambers.

The decision in the JMM bribery case, it is submitted in all humility, requires immediate correction by a competent Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.


(2000 – 2007)

RAJA RAM PAL CASE:

In the case of Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors[20]  the Court dealt with the legal question of whether cash for query is a mere moral wrong or not? Court held that:
“It was also urged that taking on its face value, the allegations against the petitioners were that they had accepted money for tabling of questions in Parliament. Nothing had been done within the four walls of the House. At the most, therefore, it was a 'moral wrong' but cannot fall within the mischief of 'legal wrong' so as to empower the House to take any action. According to the petitioners, 'moral obligations' can neither be converted into 'constitutional obligations' nor non-observance thereof would violate the scheme of the Constitution. No action, therefore, can be taken even if it is held that the allegations were well-founded.
I am unable to uphold the contention. It is true that Indian Parliament is not a 'Court'. It cannot try anyone or any case directly, as a court of justice can, but it can certainly take up such cases by invoking its jurisdiction concerning powers and privileges.
Court further relied on Sir Erskine May while dealing with 'Corruption or impropriety', Court held that:
“The acceptance by a Member of either House of a bribe to influence him in his conduct as a Member, or of any fee, compensation or reward connection with the promotion of or opposition to any bill, resolution, matter or thing submitted or intended to be submitted to either House, or to a committee, is a contempt. Any person who is found to have offered such a corrupt consideration is also in contempt. A transaction of this character is both a gross affront to the dignity of the House concerned and an attempt to pervert the parliamentary process implicit in Members' free discharge of their duties to the House and (in the case of the Commons) to the electorate.”
Reference was also made to "Cash for questions", which started in 1993. It was alleged that two members of Parliament, Tim Smith and Neil Hamilton received payments/gifts in exchange for tabling parliamentary questions. Both of them had ultimately resigned.
The rapidly accelerating and intensifying atmosphere of suspected corruption-sleaze-in public life caused the Prime Minister to appoint a judicial inquiry into standards of conduct in public life.
The Committee went into the allegations against the officers of Parliament and recommended punishment. It criticized the role of the Press as well, but no action had been taken against the newspaper.
Solomon Commission and Nolan Committee also considered the problem of corruption and bribery prevailing in the system and made certain suggestions and recommendations including a recommendation to clarify the legal position as to trial of such cases.
Court here further states that we are not expressing any opinion one way or the other on the criminal trial of such acts as also the correctness or otherwise of the law laid down in P.V. Narsimha Rao[21]. To me, however, there is no doubt and it is well-settled that in such cases, Parliament has power to take up the matter so far as privileges are concerned and it can take an appropriate action in accordance with law. If it feels that the case of 'Cash for query' was made out and it adversely affected honesty, integrity and dignity of the House, it is open to the House to attempt to ensure restoration of faith in one of the pillars of democratic polity.
PRESENT VIEW:
CASH FOR VOTE SCAM (22.7.08)
Three Bharatiya Janata Party MPs created history by smuggling in Rs 1 crore into the Lok Sabha. When Ashok Argal (Morena), Fagan Singh Kulaste (Mandla) and Mahavir Bhagora (Salumber) got up from their seats and moved towards the Speaker's chair, they took out leather bags and stunned the nation by waving wads of Rs 1,000 notes.
The picture will remain etched in nation's memory but are the allegations by Argal that he was paid the money to abstain from voting during the trust vote. Whatever evidence was reportedly recorded through the television channel CNN-IBN's sting operation is not yet made public, but the BJP attacked the Congress and the SP by briefing media about their side of story.
BJP General Secretary Arun Jaitley on Wednesday gave the media evidence against Amar Singh. He stated that "The first hard evidence in this case of bribing of our MP is that SP's leader Revti Raman Singh went to the house of Argal. The cameraman and reporter Siddhartha Gautam are the witnesses. Both belong to CNN-IBN. Argal's room is bugged and the whole conversation between Revti Singh and Argal is video-recorded where Singh mentions that 'aap abstain kijiye', so Argal asks him, "What will be the terms?" Singh says, "jo amount tay hona hai vo Amar Singh ji ke saath meeting main tay hoga'. (The amount will be fixed in a meeting with Amar Singh)."
"Next, we have statement of three MPs. Then there were security guards present at Argal's house. (They know Singh visited Argal's home.) The drivers of the cars that drove Singh to Argal's home can be made witness, too. After all, criminal law will apply here. There are many ways to investigate the bribing episode. Revti Singh fixes the appointment at 9.30/10 at Amar Singh's home. The driver who drove them to Amar Singh's home is a witness. The reporter and cameraman of CNN-IBN who followed them are witness again. There is a video recording of them going in and coming out of Amar Singh's home."
"Whatever Amar Singh and the BJP MPs discussed is available in their statement. BJP MPs said in their statement that Amar Singh told them that they (UPA) have got the numbers (majority in Parliament). But, still, he can pay Rs 3 crore as a "token" amount to each of them to abstain.  He said he would give some advance, too. He insisted that Argal should take along with him the advance money. But Argal told Amar Singh how could he take money out from his home when the media people are standing outside his house? So Amar Singh said that his man would deliver the advance money to his house.
"At that time, Amar Singh also arranged a telephonic talk with Congress' Ahmed Patel where Patel says "okay" to the arrangement. Then there is video evidence of all of them coming out of Amar Singh's home.
"Act three of the story is played again at Argal's home. Within 30 minutes of Argal reaching home, Sanjeev Saxena from Amar Singh's office arrives. Scores of journalists have seen him at Amar Singh's residence still Amar Singh now claims that he doesn't know him at all. Saxena comes with a bag full of money. He told Argal that Amar Singh has sent Rs 1 crore as advance money and remaining amount will be paid after the voting. Third BJP MP inquires about his advance; then Saxena dials Amar Singh and both talk about the money matter. This talk is recorded on hidden camera. The evidence of the calls can easily be found. If someone says that there is inadequate evidence of bribes to MPs, then they will have to rewrite the law of evidence."
"In short, you have an evidence of an offer, an evidence of a meeting, and, you have evidence of delivery of the amount. These evidences are conclusive for conviction of all the conspirators."
"The JMM bribery case judgment said in the case of bribing of JMM MPs the Prevention of Corruption Act is not applicable because it was the case of voting inside the Lok Sabha. I don't agree with the judgment and I think it should be reviewed. But, in this case the JMM judgment may not apply because it is the case of money paid outside the Lok Sabha to not enter it. I think, any Indian can file an RTI application and access the CD from the Speaker."
"The Congress can't get away from the blame because the agent (Samajwadi Party) was acting only for the benefit of the principal (Congress). The channel is not showing it, but they are not denying the existence of the tape. We know the truth and obviously, only truth is recorded on the tape.[22]"
The Enquiry Committee that went into the alleged cash-for-vote scam during the July 22 trust vote would be presenting its report to Lok Sabha on Thursday.
The Committee was constituted by Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee  after three BJP MPs -- Ashok Argal, Fagan ingh Kulaste and Mahavir Bhagora -- displayed wads of currency notes in the House alleging that huge sums were offered to them to save the Manmohan Singh government.
The panel headed by senior Congress MP V Kishore Chandra Deo will place the report on the table of the House tomorrow, sources said. In its report, the Committee is understood to have suggested that the money trail could be probed by an investigating agency like CBI or the Income Tax department. 
The voluminous report which will comprise evidence given by witnesses and verbatim transcriptions of sittings also carry the "dissent" notes by the Bharatiya Janata Party's V K Malhotra, Mohd Salim of the Communist Party of India-Marxist and Ramgopal Yadav of the Samajwadi Party.
The three BJP MPs earlier alleged that Samajwadi Party leader Amar Singh  and Congress leader Ahmed Patel were behind the attempt to lure them to the ruling side. Singh and Patel have, however, denied the charges. While Argal and Kulaste have appeared before the panel, the third BJP MP Mahavir Bhagora could not appear as he was suffering from heart ailment[23].
CONCLUSION

These privileges should not be allowed to be used in such a manner as to nullify themselves and become rights against the people. The specific parliamentary privileges which may be deemed to be in conformity with contemporary thinking and absolutely necessary for the free and independent functioning of the institution of Parliament should be clearly defined, delimited and simplified.  Time is now ripe for removing the existing uncertainty and anxiety of the Press and the people through early codification. A joint Committee of the two Houses may be set up to lay down the privileges in precise terms and to recommend appropriate piecemeal or comprehensive legislation.
Time is now ripe for removing the existing uncertainty and anxiety of the press and the people through early codification.  A joint Committee of the two Houses may be set up to lay down the privileges in precise terms and to recommend appropriate piecemeal or comprehensive legislation.
Indian legislatures have been enjoying the privileges of freedom of speech since the commencement of the constitution in 1950. The legislative privileges have been expressly provided in article 105 and 194 in the case of state legislature. The privilege of freedom of speech is absolute and sole responsibility for preventing the misuse of privileges and punishing those who are guilty thereof.
In view of the immunity conferred on the member's right to speech and action in the House, its misuse can have serious effects on the rights and freedom of the people who could otherwise seek the protection of the courts of law. Members, therefore, as people's representatives, are under greater obligation to exercise this right with utmost care and without any prejudice to the law of the land. The Committee of Privileges, has emphasized that a Member of Parliament does not enjoy unrestricted licence of speech within the walls of the House. The Committee has observed: It is against the rules of parliamentary debate and decorum to make defamatory statements or allegations of incriminatory nature against any person and the position is all the worse if such allegations are made against persons who are not in a position to defend themselves on the floor of the House. The privilege of freedom of speech can only be secured, if members do not abuse it.
There is a clear demarcation as to what all rights and privileges are absolute and what are not. For example, in India Legislative Assemblies and Parliament never discharge any judicial function and their historical and constitutional background does not support their claim to be regarded as courts of record in any sense. No immunity from scrutiny
by courts of general warrants issued by House in India can therefore be claimed.
Both the Parliament and State Legislatures have a duty to look carefully before making any law, so that it doesn't harm other rights. It is also a duty of the members to properly use these privileges and not misuse them for alternate purposes that is not in the favour of general interest of nation and public at large.




[1] R.S.Nayak v. A.R.Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684.
[2] Ricoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 137 (1981 edn. And trs. John B. Thompson).
[3] (1998) 4 SCC 626.
[4]  Article 105(2) lays down: “No Member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any Committee thereof…..”.
[5](1948) 75 IA 41.
[6]1939 FCR 159.
[7] (1960) 2 SCR 89, 100-101.
[8](1955) 2 SCR 925, 932-933.
[9](1955) 1 SCR 1302.
[10] It is interesting to see that the law is not different in the USA also as is evident from the observations of Chief Justice burger in United States v. Brewster, (33 L Ed 2d 507) which run thus: “Taking a bribe is no legislative process or function, it is no legislative act; it is not by any conceivable interpretation, an act performed as part of, or even incidental to the role of a legislator.”
[11](1970) 2 SCC 272.
[12](1961) 3 SCR486.
[13] Explanation (d) of Section 7 :  “a person who receives gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend to do or is to or is not in a position to do or, has not done”.
[14] 26 L Ed 377.
[15] Supra No. 139.
[16] Supra No.140.
[17] Clause (2) Article 361: No Criminal proceeding whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against the president or the Governor a State in any Court during his term of office.
“Clause (3) Article 361:  No process for the arrest or imprisonment of the President or the Governor of a State shall issue from any court during his term of office“
[18] (1991) 4 SCC 699 (719).
[19] 51 ELR 1.
[20] (2007) 3 SCC 184.
[21]Supra No.66.
[22] <http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/23upavote26.htm>, <last visited on 16th of Mar, 2009>.