EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION
Other than the internal aid to interpretation which are part of a statute itself there are
other aids which are not part of the statute. These are known as external aid to interpretation.
The court can consider recourse outside the Act such as historical settings, objects and
reasons, bills, debates, text books, dictionaries etc. Recourse to external aid is justified only to
well-recognized limits.
External aids may be employed in the construction of statutes if the words and
languages employed are not free from ambiguity and cannot be cleared even by resort to
internal aids. External aids in the construction of statutes are permitted to explain the state of
law at the time it was passed but not to interpret the Act. Further recourse to external aids in
interpreting statutory provisions would be justified only within well recognized limits and primarily
the effect of the statutory provision must be judged, on a fair and reasonable construction of the
words used by the statute itself.
Since the courts are entitled to consider such external or historical facts as may be
necessary to understand the subject matter to which the statue relates, or to have regard to the
mischief which the statute is intended to remedy, the exclusionary rule was relaxed to admit the
reports of the commissions preceding a statutory measure as evidence of surrounding
circumstances with reference to which the words in the statute are used.
Reference to parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of
legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to absurdity.
Even in such cases references in court to parliamentary material should only be permitted
where such material clearly discloses the mischief aimed or at the legislative intention lying
beyond the ambiguous or obscure words. In the case of statements made in Parliament, as at
present advised, I cannot foresee that any statement other than the statement of the minister or
other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet these criteria. In reaching this conclusion Lord Browne
Wilkinson reasoned that “the Court cannot attach a meaning to words which they cannot bear,
but if the words are capable of bearing more than one meaning why should not Parliament’s
true intention be enforced.” It was pointed out that white papers and official reports could be
looked at for finding the mischief and as a ministerial statement made in Parliament was an
equally authoritative source of such information there was no reason why the courts be cut off
from this source.
In contrast to the traditional English practice, under the American practice, the old rule of
exclusion of parliamentary history has been very much relaxed. Although it is generally
accepted that “debates in Congress are not appropriate or even reliable guides to the meaning
of the language of an enactment”, it has been held that the said rules “is not violated by
resorting to debates as a means of ascertaining the environment at the time of enactment of
particular law, that is, the history of the period when it was adopted.” Further, it appears to have
been well accepted that “the reports of a committee, including the bill, as introduced, changes
made in the frame of the bill in the course of its passage and the statement made by the
committee chairman in charge of it, stand upon a different footing, and may be resorted to under
proper qualifications.”
The Supreme Court, speaking generally, to begin with, enunciated the rule of exclusion
of Parliamentary history in the way it was traditionally enunciated by English courts, but on
many an occasion, the court used this aid in resolving questions of construction. The court has
now veered to the view that legislative history within circumspect limits may be consulted by
courts in resolving ambiguities. But the court still sometimes, like the English courts, makes a
distinction between use of material for finding the mischief dealt with by the Act and its use for
finding the meaning of the Act. As submitted earlier this distinction is unrealistic and has now
been abandoned by the House of Lords.
It was held that speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the
course of the debates on the draft Constitution cannot be admitted as extrinsic aid to the
construction of the Constitution, and similarly the debates in Parliament on a Bill are not
admissible for construction of the Act which is ultimately enacted.
In Indira Sawhney Vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477, while interpreting Article 16 (4)
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court referred to Dr. Ambedkar’s speech in the Constituent
Assembly and observed: “That the debates in the Constituent Assembly can be relied upon as
an aid to interpretation of a constitution provision is borne out by a series of decisions of this
Court. Since the expression backward class of citizens is not defined in the Constitution,
reference to such debates is permissible to ascertain at any rate the context, background and
objective behind them. Particularly where the court wants to ascertain the ‘original intent’ such
reference may be unavoidable.
The Statements made by the Chairman of the Standing Committee which considered the
Bill are of great significance in this regard. Legislators themselves attach great importance to
the work of these committees, while considering the statements of legislators, it should be
ascertained whether the participating legislators concurred as to the meaning of the language.
(i) Objects and reasons :
The statements of object and reasons cannot be used as an aid to construction. Objects
and reasons of a statue is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out the legislative intent,
only when the language is obscure or ambiguous.
As regards the Statements of Objects and Reasons appended to a Bill, it must be
remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in
the House and what objects he sought to achieve. But those objects and reasons may or may
not correspond to the objective which the majority of members had in view when they passed it
into law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House or
Houses, and there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects
thereby sought to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the
House as an Act of the Legislature, for they do not form part of the Bill and are not voted upon
by members.
In CIT, M.P. Vs. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832, while dealing with Section 16(3) of the
Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, as introduced by the amending Act IV of 1937, and in construing
the words ‘any individual’ and ‘such individual’ occurring therein restricted their meaning to
‘males’ on a consideration that the Statements of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill of
the amending Act made it clear that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the one
resulting from the widespread practice of husbands entering onto nominal partnerships with
their wives and fathers admitting their minor children to the benefits of the partnership of which
they were members and that the only intention of the Legislature was to include the income
derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total income of the male
assessee, the husband or the father, as the case may be.
Reports of Commissions or Inquiry Committees preceding the introduction of a Bill have
also been referred to as evidence of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of
mischief or evil intended to be remedied and at times for interpreting the Act. However, in CIT,
A.P. Vs. Jayalakshmi Rice & Oil Mills Contractor Co., AIR 1971 SC 1015, that the report of the
special committee which had been appointed by the Government of India to examine the
provisions of the Bill which later became the Partnership Act cannot be admitted for interpreting
the provisions of the Act. But in R. S. Nayak Vs. A. R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684, the Supreme
Court differing from the view taken by Jayalakshmi Rice and Oil Mills case held that report of the
Committee which preceded the enactment of a legislative, reports of joint parliamentary
committee and report of a committee set up for collecting information leading to the legislation
are permissible external aids to construction of the Act.
White paper issued by the Government detailing the facts leading to enactment of a
statute is also admissible for understanding the background when the court is called upon to
interpret and decide the validity of the statute. Extensive reference was made by the Supreme
Court to the white paper for understanding the background of the Ramjanma Bhumi Babri
Masjid dispute in deciding the reference made under Article 143 and the constitutionality of the
Acquisition of certain Areas of Ayodhya Act, 1993.
(ii) Historical facts and surrounding circumstances :
It has already been noticed that the court is entitled to take into account “such external
or historical facts as may be necessary to understand the subject matter of the statute” or to
have regard to “the surrounding circumstances” which existed at the time of passing of the
statute.
The policy followed in the working of an earlier Act can be presumed to be known to
Parliament while legislating subsequently on a related subject and will thus be admissible in
construing the later Act.
Like any other external aid, the inferences from historical and surrounding facts must
give away to the clear language employed in the enactment itself. The rule of admissibility of
this external aid in case of ambiguous enactments is of general application and a number of
cases in this respect have already been discussed while dealing with the admissibility of
Parliamentary History.
The function of the Court being to find out the intention of the law-makers, the Court has
to discover the particular meaning of a given word in an enactment which the law-makers
intended it to be given. In case of older statutes, knowledge of the historical facts relating to
them becomes indispensable for understanding the meaning of ambiguous words and the
expressions used in them. To quote the observations of Mukherjee, J., in this regard; It may be
useful to remember the well known historical facts that led to the passing of the enactment.” He
further observed: it is a settled canon of construction that the interpreter should place himself,
as far as possible, in the position of those whose words he is interpreting and the meaning of
certain words and terms used in ancient document or statute can be properly explained only by
reference to the circumstances existing at the time when the statute was enacted or document
was written.
(iii) History of Legislation :
The Supreme Court has held that parliamentary history of an enactment is not
admissible to construe its meaning. However, the Courts can look into the history of an Act and
the background and the circumstances in which the Act was passed, for the limited purpose of
appreciating the mischief which the legislature had in mind and the remedy which it wanted to
provide for preventing that mischief and not for the purpose of aiding themselves in construing
the provisions of the act.
We have nothing to do with the history of the words unless the words are doubtful and
require historical investigation to explain them and to clear away the doubts which the
phraseology of the statute may have credited. It is useless to enter into any enquiry as to the
history of an enactment, or as to any supposed defect in a former legislation which it was
intended to meet, where the words of the enactment are clear, although it may possibly be
material to do so where the words are capable of two meanings. Legislative history of an Act
may, where the meaning of the words used is doubtful, be resorted to as an aid to construction
but no aid should possibly be derived from the legislative history of another act passed some
years after the Act in question. Where the statute has undergone by way of amendment or
otherwise, it is not only permissible but of great assistance in the matter of interpretation to
examine the legislative intent of the provisions.
(iv) Contemporaneous expositio :
Contemporaneous event form an important extraneous aid to the construction of a
statute. A consideration of the history of the period of enactment including the history of the law
itself, the nature of the preceding law, and the mischief that was sought to be removed by the
law is called for. In the words of Blackstone: “The most universal and effectual way of
discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious is by considering the reason
and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the legislatures to enact it.” In the case of ambiguity of
different articles of the construction, the reports of the Drafting Committees of the Constituent
Assembly may be consulted but not with a view to controlling the meaning of the articles in
question. In order to find out the precise evil that the legislators tried to remedy, it is useful to
scan the opinions and statements of the legislators expressed at the time of discussion of the
law and ascertain the relevant conditions existing at the time of enactment.
Historical works and public officials documents may be referred to in order to ascertain
ancient facts of a public nature. In construing the old statutes it has been usual to pay regard to
the construction put upon them by the judges who lived at or soon after the time when they were
made because they were best able to judge the intention of the makers at that time.
Subject to use made of contemporary official statements and statutory instruments, the
principle of contemporanea expositio is not applicable to a modern statute. Even if the persons
who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular manner, that does not prevent the court in
giving to the Act its true construction. The doctrine is confined to the construction of ambiguous
language used in very old statutes where indeed the language itself have had a rather different
meaning in those days.
But a uniform and consistent departmental practice arising out of construction placed
upon an ambiguous statute by the highest executive officers at or near the time of its enactment
and continuing for a long period of time is an admissible aid to the proper construction of the
statute by the Court and would not be disregarded except for cogent reasons. The controlling
effect of this aid which is known as ‘executive construction’ would depend upon various factors
such as the length of time for which it is followed, the nature of rights and property affected by it,
the injustice resulting from its departure and the approval that it has received in judicial decision
or in legislation. Contemporary official statements throwing light on the construction of a statute
and statutory instruments made under it have been used as contemporanea expositio to
interpret not only ancient but even recent statutes both in England and in India.
The principles of contemporanea expositio and executive construction though relevant
for solving a case of an ambiguity cannot be used for bringing about an implied repeal or quasi
repeal.
Although acquiescence even for a long period does not make a void rule valid, but when
rules are made by the Government under earlier enactments on the basis of a particular
construction of the enabling section which is followed by omission of all concerned to dispute
that construction for a long time by challenging the validity of the rules and the enabling section
is re-enacted without any material change, an inference arises that the construction on which
the rules proceeded correctly represents the intention of the Parliament and has its approval.
(v) Previous decisions :
It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American legal system to attach great weight to the
doctrine of judicial precedent. It is, however, only the ratio-decidendi that has the force of law.
When the language of a statute is ambiguous and it is found that particular interpretation
has been put upon it by a number of authorities extending a great length of time it would be
unwise and wrong to disturb that interpretation. It will be dangerous attempt to construe one Act
by a reference to decision on other Acts which are quite different in character, even although the
actual phrase in the several Acts may be the same. Where there have been decided cases
before an Act is amended if the amendment does not expressly show that the law as interpreted
in decisions is altered, the rule laid down by the decision is to be adhered to.
(vi) Public policy :
Legislation is intended to accord with and given shape to the established principles of
public policy, and not to transgress them. If the statute, therefore, tends itself to double
interpretation; the interpretation that achieves this object should be preferred. The effects and
consequences of the proposed construction of the enactment have also to be examined, and if
the examination reveals that one of the proposed construction goes against the spirit of public
policy, and the other does not, the reasonable and beneficial interpretation is to be accepted.
Judicial observation on this point do not show that the courts are in favour of enlarging or
restraining the literal sense of the legislation, but rather their anxiety is that the interpretation
consistent with the public policy should be selected.
(vii) Use of foreign decisions :
On a question of construction of Indian statutes sobered use of foreign decisions of
countries following the same system of jurisprudence as ours and rendered on statute in pari
materia has been permitted by practice in Indian courts. The assistance of such decision is
subject to the qualification that prime importance is always to be given to the language of the
relevant Indian statute, the circumstances and the setting in which it is enacted and the Indian
conditions where it is to be applied and that it is not to be forgotten that there is always an
element of risk in taking ready and hasty assistance from such decisions.
If the terms are plain and unambiguous of an Indian Act, the Court cannot have resort to
the position in law as it has been obtained in England or in other countries where the statute
was enacted by the legislature. Such recourse would be permissible only if there was any latent
or patent ambiguity and the courts were required to find out what was the true intention of the
legislature. Where, however, the terms of the statute do not admit of any such ambiguity, it is
the clear duty of the Court to construe the plain term of the statute and give to them their legal
effect.
It is also dangerous to construe an Indian Act by reference to the English Act, however,
closely the language of the two Acts may approximate and it is not permissible for an Indian
court to enlarge the language of an Indian statue by any implication of English doctrines or to
embark upon an examination of the English law based upon English statutes or English practice
when the matter is expressly governed by the Indian statute. It is not legitimate to apply English
decision on English Acts to the construction of an Indian statute, especially so when the English
Acts are differently worded because then it is much more likely to cause confusion than to
render assistance.
Where the basis of the Indian legislature on a particular subject is the English Law, it will
not only be permissible but also a great advantage to see what the English Law is not that
particular point when the provisions of the Indian statute are not very clear. Similarly, when the
language of the Indian and English statutes is identical, or the provisions of an Indian statute are
in pari materia with the provisions of an English statute, the Courts would be entitled to seek
guidance, find help from the decisions of English courts in such matters.
(viii) Dictionaries :
When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find
out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. However, in
selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the context
as it is a fundamental rule that “the meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must take
their colour from the context in which they appear”. Therefore, “when the context makes the
meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular
meaning out of the diverse meaning a word is capable of, according to lexicographers. Further,
words and expressions at times have a technical or a legal meaning and in that case they are
understood in that sense. Again judicial decisions expounding the meaning of words in
construing statutes in pari materia will have more weight than the meaning furnished by
dictionaries.
(ix) Statutes in pari materia :
It has already been seen that a statute must be read as a whole as words are to be
understood in their context. Extension of this rule of context permits reference to other statues in
pari materia, i.e., statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same
system. The text of the statute taken as a whole is, no doubt, the most important material for
ascertaining the intention of the legislature, but the external aids by having recourse to statutes
in pari materia are also admissible. These external aids wide the scope of ‘context’ as including
not only other provisions of the same statue, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other
statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy.
The meaning of the phrase ‘pari materia’ has been explained in an American case in the
following words: “Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing, or to the
same class of persons or things. The word ‘par’ must not be confounded with the word ‘similis’.
It is used in opposed to it – intimating not likeness merely but identity. It is a phrase applicable
to public statutes or general laws made at different items and in reference to same subject.
When the two pieces of legislation are of different scopes, it cannot be said that they are in pari
materia.
Acts dealing with various socio-economic plans have to be read in a complementary
manner so that they do not create contradictions while operating in the same field. For example,
a tenancy Act which is enacted to ameliorate the conditions of tenants and which confers
exclusive jurisdiction on revenue courts to decide whether tenancy right was acquired by a
person has to be read complimentary to a ceiling Act which is passed with the object of so
distributing the agricultural resources of the community as to subserve the common good and
which confers jurisdiction on an authority functioning under that Act to decide whether a tenancy
right was created bona fide or to defeat the provisions of the Act.
(x) Assistance of earlier statutes :
Use of same words in similar connection in a later statute gives rise to a presumption
that they are intended to convey the same meaning as in the earlier statute. On the same logic
when words in an earlier statue have received an authoritative exposition by a superior court,
use of same words in similar context in a later Act will give rise to a presumption that Parliament
intends that the same interpretation should also be followed for construction of those words in
the later statute.
However, it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one
Act with reference to their use in another Act, and decisions rendered with reference to
construction of one Act cannot be applied with reference to the provisions of another Act, when
the two Acts are not in pari materia. There is also presumption that the Legislature while
repealing one statute and substituting another in different terms intends to make the minimum
changes in the previous law that it is possible to reconcile with the actual wording of the new
statute particularly where the new statute is passed with a new object, e.g., to give effect to a
new international convention. Further, when there is no ambiguity in the statute, it may not be
permissible to refer to, for purpose of its construction any previous legislation or decisions
rendered thereunder. Decisions relating to constitutional validity of one statute, on the same
principles are not taken as a safe guide for pronouncing on the validity of another statute which
may not be in pari materia.
Just as use of same language in a later statute as was used in an earlier one in pari
materia is suggestive of the intention of the Legislature that the language so used in the later
statute is used in the same sense as in the earlier one, change of language in a later statute in
pari materia is suggestive that change of interpretation is intended.
The alteration of the law by the Legislature, however, does not give rise to any inference
that the previous decisions were wrong or even that those who proposed the alteration were of
that opinion. But when judicial decisions have taken two different view of a statutory provision
which is re-enacted with certain modifications, the change in language may be suggestive of
acceptance of one view by the Legislature and a meaning consistent with that view should be
placed on the provisions re-enacted. When the Legislature makes suitable amendments to give
effect to a prior judicial decision, it should be inferred that the decision correctly interpreted the
law before the amendment.
Change in language is not, however, always indicative of a change in construction. The
alteration in language in or by a later statue may be the result of many other factors. For
instance, words may be omitted in a later statute when they were mere surplus age and the
natural and ordinary meaning of the existing words indicates no intention of alteration of
meaning. Similarly, addition of words may be to make clear a meaning which was already
implied. Further, the change in wording may be because the draftsman wanted to improve the
style.
(xi) Assistance of later statutes :
It is within the authority of the Legislature to amend an earlier Act or to declare its
meaning by enacting a new Act and the Legislature is even competent to so declare a meaning
that the “declaration offended the plain language of the earlier Act”. In such cases, the later
statute operates directly by its own force and not merely as an aid to construction of the earlier
statute. But a legislation proceeding upon an erroneous assumption of the existing law without
directly amending or declaring the law is ineffective to change the law.
A later statute, is therefore, normally not used as an aid to construction of an earlier one.
But when an earlier Act is truly ambiguous a later Act may in certain circumstances serve as
parliamentary exposition of the former.
Section 293 (4) of the Cr.P.C. before its amendment used the expression ‘Director’ only.
After amendment, ‘Deputy Director’ and ‘Assistant Director’ were expressly included with the
‘Director’. The Supreme Court after referring to this change held that ‘Joint Director’ who was
higher in rank to Deputy Director and Assistant Director must be deemed to be included in
‘Director’ otherwise he would also have been expressly included by the amendment and that
this construction was also applicable to the word ‘Director’ before the section was amended.
(xii) Incorporation of an earlier Act into later; Reference of earlier Act into later :
Incorporation of an earlier act into a later act is a legislative device adopted for the sake
of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into
the later. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a
later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had
been bodily transposed into it.
Ordinarily, if an Act is incorporated in a later Act, the intention is to incorporate the earlier
Act, with all the amendments made in it up to the date of incorporate. The rule that the repeal or
amendment of the Act which is incorporated by reference in a later Act is not applicable for
purpose of the later act is subject to qualifications and exceptions. A distinction is in this context
drawn between incorporation and mere reference of an earlier Act into a later Act. Further, a
distinction is also drawn when what is referred to is not an earlier Act or any provision from it but
law on a subject in general. There is, however, no controversy on the point that when any Act or
rules are adopted in any later Act or rules, such adoption normally whether by incorporation or
mere reference takes in all the amendments in the earlier Act or rules till the date of adoption.
(xiii) Codifying and Consolidating Statutes :
Codifying statutes – The purpose of a codifying statute is to present an orderly and
authoritative statement of the leading rules of law on a given subject, whether those rules are to
be found in statute law or common law.
The essence of a codifying statute “is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of
which it is declared the law and it is not the province of a Judge to disregard or go outside the
letter of the enactment according to its true construction”. Thus a question of res judicata in
relation to a suit has to be decided solely in terms of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and
not on general principles of res judicata. A matter concerning the admission and disposal of
criminal appeals has to be dealt with in terms of code of criminal procedure and not outside
those provisions, and a court has no power to grant exemption from the bar of limitation except
in accordance with the provisions contained in the Indian Limitation Act. Similarly in construing
the Hindu Succession Act 1956, which is an Act to amend and codify the law relating to
interstate succession among Hindus, it is not permissible to apply the principles of Hindu Law
on matters covered by the Act.
Consolidating statutes – The purpose of the consolidating statute is to present the whole
body of statutory law on a subject in complete form, repealing the former statute. In case of
purely consolidating statutes the presumption is that such a statute is not intended to alter the
law, but this prime facie view has to yield to plain words to the contrary. Consistent with the
initial presumption, that alteration of law is not intended, certain principles logically follow. It is
thus relevant to refer to the previous state of the law or to judicial decisions interpreting the
repealed Acts for purposes of construction of corresponding provisions in the consolidating Act.
Indeed the question of construction of a section in a consolidating Act may for this reason be
really a question of construction of an earlier Act in which that section first appeared, and it may
be necessary to refer to the various Acts in the series as also to the common law existing at the
time when the earliest Act was enacted. Further, as provisions in consolidating act may have
their origin in different legislations, in case of inconsistency between two such provisions, it may
be legitimate to refer to respective dates of their first enactment for resolving the inconsistency.
Similarly, the presumption that same word when used at different places in the same Act has
the same meaning, has hardly any application to consolidating Act when once it is shown that
the different provisions where the same word occurs had their origin in different legislations.
And, statutes not expressly repealed or modified will be assumed not to have been affected by a
consolidating Act by mere use of some general words in certain of its provisions. On the same
principle any well-established principle of general law will not be taken to be abrogated without
clear words by a consolidation Act.
It is not permissible to construe a section in the consolidating Act in such cases with
reference to circumstances existing at the time when it was first enacted in a former Act. A
consolidating Act may further be an amending act. This additional purpose is usually indicated
in the preamble or in the long title by use of words ‘An Act to consolidate the amend’. It is not a
sound canon of construction to refer to the provisions in repealed statutes when the
consolidating statute contains enactment dealing with the same subject in different terms. Even
when a section from an earlier act is repeated in a consolidation Act in identical terms the
framework in which it is placed may be different.
The distinction between consolidating statutes and other statutes for purposes of
interpretation is being obliterated. Recent decisions have emphasized that a consolidation act
should be interpreted according to normal canons of construction and recourse to repealed
enactments can be taken only to solve any ambiguity, for the process of consolidation would
lose much of its point if, whenever a question as to construction of a consolidating act arose,
reference had to be made to the statutes which it has consolidated and repealed. The primary
rule of construction of a consolidation act is to examine the language used in the act itself
without any reference to the repealed statutes. It is only when the consolidation act gives no
guidance as to its proper interpretation that it is permissible to refer to the repealed enactments
for guidance and it is never legitimate to have recourse to repealed enactments to make
obscure or ambiguous that which is clear in the consolidation act. It is only when there is a real
or substantial difficulty or ambiguity that the court is to attempt to resolve the difficulty or
ambiguity by reference to the legislation which has been repealed and re-enacted in the
consolidation act.
(xiv) Later Social, Political and Economic Developments and Scientific
It is possible that in some special cases a statute may have to be historically interpreted
“as if one were interpreting it the day after it was passed.” But generally statutes are if the
“always speaking variety” and the court is free to apply the current meaning of the statute of
present day conditions. Reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the passing of the
statute does not, therefore, mean that the language used, at any rate, in a modern statute,
should be held to be inapplicable to social, political and economic developments or to scientific
inventions not known at the time of the passing of the statute.
In dealing with the word ‘textiles’ and in holding that cotton/woolen dry felts are textiles,
the Supreme Court said that it must be remembered that the concept of textiles is not a static
concept and it has, having regard to newly developing materials, methods, techniques and
processes, a continually expanding content the new kinds of fabrics may be invented which may
legitimately, without doing any violence to the language, be regarded as textiles.
In yet another case relating to the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Supreme Court pointed
out that the code should as far as its language permits, be construed with reference to modern
Inventions :
needs not with reference to notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the code
was enacted.
