2. INTERNAL AIDS OF INTERPRETATION
Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule
of the interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. If the
words are clear and free from ambiguity, there is no need to refer to other means of
interpretation. But if the words are vague and ambiguous then internal aids may be sought for
interpretation.
(i) Context :
If the words of a statute are ambiguous then the context must be taken into
consideration. The context includes other provisions of the statute, its preamble, the existing
state of law and other legal provisions. The intention behind the meaning of the words and the
circumstances under which they are framed must be considered.
(ii) Long Title :
It is now settled that Long Title of an Act is a part of the Act and is admissible as an aid
to construction. The long title which often precedes the preamble must be distinguished with
the short title; the former taken along with the preamble or even in its absence is a good guide
regarding the object, scope or purpose of the Act, whereas the latter being only an abbreviation
for purposes of reference is not a useful aid to construction.
The title of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, was utilized to indicate that the
object of the Act is to impose taxes on sales that take place within the province.
If the language is ambiguous the long title of the Act may be looked as to resolve the
ambiguity, but it may not be looked at to modify the interpretation of plain language. The
operation of the Act could be in any way controlled by reference to the long title. If the meaning
of an enactment is clear that meaning is not to be narrowed or restricted by reference to the
long title.
Referring to the Trade Dispute Act 1906 Lord Moulton said: “The Title of the Act is
undoubtedly part of the Act itself and it is legitimate to use it for the purpose of interpreting the
Act as a whole and ascertaining its scope”.
(iii) Preamble :
The preamble of a statute like the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to
construction. Although not an enacting part, the preamble is expected to express the scope,
object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title.
The preamble of a statute is a prefatory statement at its beginning following the title and
preceding the enacting clause, explaining or declaring the policy and purpose, the reasons and
motive for, and the object sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute. The
preamble of a statute like the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to
construction.
The preamble in general, affords a clue to discover the plain object and the general
intention of the Legislates in passing the Act and often helps to the solution of doubtful points.
Though the preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, it is settled
rule that the preamble cannot, for any purpose, control, restrict, extend, qualify, alter, detract
from or add to the enactments themselves where they are expressed in clear and unambiguous
terms. A preamble can only be brought in as an aid to construction if the language of a statute
is not clear and admits of plurality of meanings, but where it is clear and unambiguous preamble
cannot be used to extend or limit the meaning and scope of a statute. Aid can be taken from the
preamble which denotes the policy and the object behind the Act. The Preamble is the key to
the statute and affords clue to the scope of the statute when the words construed by themselves
without the aid of the preamble are fairly capable of more than one meaning.
The principle has also been enunciated by the Supreme Court which observed: “It is one
of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the
preamble must be disregarded though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not
clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again, where very general language is used
in an enactment which, it is clear must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble
may be used to indicate to what particular instances, the enactment is intended to apply. We
cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we
could be justified in resorting to it, nay, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language
used by Parliament intended that it should have a limited application.”
It is, therefore, permissible to have recourse to it as an aid to construction of the
enacting provisions.
In Kashi Prasad v State, the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to
defeat the enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the
statute.
(iv) Headings :
The view is now settled that the Headings or Titles prefixed to sections or group of
sections can be referred to in construing an Act of the Legislature.
“A Heading” according to one view, “is to be regarded as giving the key to the
interpretation of the clauses ranged under it, unless the wording is inconsistent with such
interpretation,” and so the headings might be treated “as preambles to the provisions following
them”. But according to the other view resort to the heading can only be taken when the
enacting words are ambiguous.
Recently the Supreme Court expressed itself as follows: “It is well settled that the
headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words of the provisions; they
cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in
the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain
meaning of the words in the provision. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or
sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it
could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the provision.”
These headings or sub-headings cannot either control, restrict or extend the scope of
the sections when the language used is free from ambiguity. They are not to be taken into
consideration if the language or the section is clear. When the language of the enactment in
ambiguous the headings can be taken an indication of what the Legislature mean and may help
the court to remove the doubt.
A heading to a group of sections cannot, however, be pressed into constructive limitation
upon the exercise of the powers given by the express words of the Act. They cannot control the
plain words of the statute, but they may explain ambiguous words. If there is any doubt in the
interpretation of the words of the section, the headings certainly help court to resolve the doubt.
(v) Marginal notes :
Marginal notes are the notes that are printed at the side of the section in an Act and it
summarizes the effect of the section. They are not part of the statute.
Although opinion is not uniform, the weight of authority is in favour of the view that the
marginal note appended to a section cannot be used for construing the section.
At any rate, there can be no justification for restricting the section by the marginal note,
and the marginal note cannot certainly control the meaning of the body of the section if the
language employed therein is clear.
Marginal notes appended to Articles of the Constitution have been held to constitute part
of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly and therefore they have been made
use of in construing the Articles, i.e. Art. 286, as furnishing “prima facie”, “some clue as to the
meaning and purpose of the Article”.
The Privy Council has ruled that the marginal note to the section of an enactment cannot
be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. There is no justification for restricting the
contents of a section by its marginal notes. They are not part of the Act. A marginal note is
merely an abstract of the clause intended to catch the eye. Although a marginal note cannot
control the clear language of the section, or override the provisions of the enactment, the Courts
can consider it for the propose of arriving at a conclusion as to what according to the legislature
was the purpose of the section. The marginal note cannot, however, affect the construction of
the language used in the body of the section if it is otherwise clear and unambiguous. Marginal
notes to the section are, not to be referred to for the purpose of construction, unless they have
been inserted with the assent of the legislature. Although a marginal note cannot afford any
legitimate aid to the construction of section, it can, however, be relied upon as indicating the drift
of the section.
(vi) Punctuation :
Punctuation marks cannot control, vary or modify the plain and simple meaning of the
language of the statute. At the most they can aid in construction of ambiguous statutes. Such
assistance is also subject to the condition that the punctuation marks have been inserted with
accuracy.
Punctuation of a law, generally speaking, does not control or affect the intention of the
legislature in its enactment. The intention is generally gathered from the context to which the
words relate. Even where punctuation sometimes lends assistance in the construction of
sentences, they are always subordinate to the requirement of the context.
When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight
should undoubtedly given to the punctuations. The punctuation cannot certainly be regarded as
controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of the text.
In Gopalan’s case, KANIA, C.J., in construing Art. 2(7) (a) of the Constitution, referred to
the punctuation and derived assistance from it in reaching his conclusion that Parliament was
not obliged to prescribe both the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases,
in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months, without obtaining the
opinion of Advisory Board and that Parliament on a true construction of the clause could
prescribe either or both. The use of the word ‘which’ twice, read with the comma put after each
‘which’ was relied upon as indicative of this construction. This view has recently been overruled
in the case of Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of W.B. But it would appear, at any rate, with
respect to modern statutes, that if the statute in question is found to be carefully punctuated,
punctuation, though a minor element, may be resorted to for purpose of construction.
(vii) Definition/ Interpretation clause :
It is common to find in statutes “Definitions” of certain words and expressions used
elsewhere in the body part of the statute. The object of such definitions is to avoid the necessity
of frequent repetitions in describing all the subject matter to which the word or expression so
defined is intended to apply. Definition section may borrow definitions from an earlier Act and
the definitions so borrowed need not be found in definition section hut in some other provisions
of the earlier Act.
The Legislature has power to define a word even artificially. So the definition of a word
in the definition section may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive
of the same. When a word is defined to ‘mean’ such and such, the definition is prima facie
restrictive and exhaustive; whereas, where the word defined as declared to ‘include’ such and
such, the definition is prima facie extensive. When by an amending Act, the word ‘includes’ was
substituted for the word ‘means’ in a definition section, it was held that the intention was to
make it more extensive. Further, a definition may be in the form of ‘means and includes’, where
again the definition is exhaustive; on the other hand, if a word is defined ‘to apply to and
include’, the definition is understood as extensive.
The inclusive definition of ‘district judge’ in Article 236 (a) of the Constitution has been
very widely construed to include hierarchy of specialized Civil Courts viz. Labour Courts and
Industrial Courts which are not expressly included in the definition.
The definition section may itself be ambiguous and may have to be interpreted in the
light of the other provisions of the Act and having regard to the ordinary connotation of the word
defined. A definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be read in the context of the phrase
which it defines, realizing that the function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to a
word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain but not to contradict it or
supplant it altogether.
Wide words used in an interpretation clause may thus be given a limited meaning having
regard to the context as a whole for a word in a statute whether it be in the body of the statute or
in the interpretation clause is not to be construed without reference to the context in which it
appears. However, it will not be correct to say that a wide word in an inclusive definition should
be given a limited scope by reference merely to the ordinary meaning of the word defined.
When a word has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition
governs whenever that word is used in the body of the statute.
When a word is defined to bear a number of inclusive meanings the sense in which the
word is used in a particular provision must be ascertained from the context of the scheme of the
Act, the language of the provision and the object intended to be served thereby.
In the words of WANCHOO, J.: “It is well settled that all statutory definitions or
abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition
clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive
inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have
a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or
context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words, similar
to the words used in the present case, namely ‘unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or context’.
Because of Article 367 of the Constitution, the General Clauses Act, 1897, ‘unless the
context otherwise requires’, applies for construction of the Constitution. The definition of ‘State’
in Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act includes ‘Union Territories’ and, therefore, the word
‘State’ in Article 3 and entry 80 of the Union List in the Constitution includes Union Territories.
But as the context otherwise requires the word ‘State’ in Article 246 does not include Union
Territories.
Similarly in construing the word ‘workman’ in section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, it was held that the word included a dismissed workman although in the definition of
that word as given in section 2, a dismissed workman is included only for the purpose of
industrial disputes under section 10.
(viii) Proviso :
The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to
qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the
enactment.
In construing a section, full and natural meaning should be given to a proviso, if any.
The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall
within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. The
proper canon of construing a section which has several provisos, is to read the section and the
proviso as a whole, reconcile them and give a meaning to the whole section along with the
proviso which is a comprehensive and logical meaning. The function of a proviso is to take out
of a section a part of the category to which the section applies.
A proviso to a section in a statute is not an independent section calling for a construction
entirely removed and detached from the construction to be placed on the main section. A
proviso is subsidiary to the main section and has to be constructed in the light of the section
itself. It is true that it is also one of the rules of interpretation of statutes that if there is a clear
conflict between the enacting clause and the proviso, or if the proviso is redundant, then the
proviso will have to go. A proviso should not be construed in a manner what would nullify the
effect of the main section to which it is merely-a proviso.
The language of a proviso even if general is normally to be construed in relation to the
subject-matter covered by the section to which the proviso is appended. In other words
normally a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso.
The application of this rule presents difficulty when a proviso in a statute does not form
part of a section but is itself enacted as a separate section. The drafting of a proviso in such a
form makes it necessary to determine as to which section or sections the section containing the
proviso is enacted as exception or qualification.
Since the natural presumption is that but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section
would have included the subject-matter of the proviso, the enacting part should be generally
given such a construction which would make the exceptions carved out by the proviso
necessary and a construction which would make the exceptions unnecessary and redundant
should be avoided.
The general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso is to construe them
together without making either of them redundant or otiose. Even if the enacting part is clear,
effort is to be made to give some meaning to the proviso and to justify its necessity. But a
clause or a section worded as a proviso, may not be a true proviso and may have been placed
by way of abundant caution.
To read a proviso as providing something by way of an addendum or as dealing with a
subject not covered by the main enactment or as stating a general rule as distinguished from an
exception or qualification is ordinarily foreign to the proper function of a proviso. However, this is
only true of a real proviso. The insertion of a proviso by the draftsman is not always strictly
adhered to its legitimate use and at times a section worded as a proviso may wholly or partly be
in substance a fresh enactment adding to and not merely excepting something out of or
qualifying what goes before.
A proviso will not be normally construed as reducing the purview of enactment to a
nullity or to take away a right clearly conferred by the enactment but it has been held that if a
proviso on its true construction “is directly repugnant to the purview, the proviso shall stand and
be a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers”. And, on similar logic, it
has also been held that if out of two provisos the later is repugnant to the earlier one, the later
prevails.
(ix) Explanations :
An Explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words
contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. The meaning to be
given to an ‘Explanation’ must depend upon its terms, and “no theory of its purpose can be
entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used.” But if the language of the
Explanation shows a purpose and a construction consistent with that purpose can be
reasonably placed upon it, that construction will be preferred as against any other construction
which does not fit in with the description or the avowed purpose.
When the section deals with two categories of cases e.g. residential and non-residential
accommodations, an explanation to the section which is limited in scope to one category,
namely residential accommodations, cannot affect the scope of the section with reference to the
second category, namely non-residential accommodations.
An explanation may be added to include something within or to exclude something from
the ambit of the main enactment or the connotation of some word occurring in it. Even a
negative Explanation which excludes certain types of a category from the ambit of the
enactment may have the effect of showing that the category leaving aside the excepted types is
included within it. An explanation, normally, should be so read as to harmonize with and clear
up any ambiguity in the main section and should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of
the section. It is also possible that an explanation may have been added in a declaratory form to
retrospectively clarify a doubtful point in law and to serve as a proviso to the main section or ex
abundant cautela to allay groundless apprehensions.
(x) Schedules :
Schedules appended to statutes form part of the statute. They are added towards the
end and their use is made to avoid encumbering the sections in the statute with matters of
excessive detail. They often contain details and forms for working out the policy underlying the
sections of the statute, and at times they contain transitory provisions which remain in force till
the main provisions of the statute are brought into operation. Occasionally they contain such
rules and forms which can be suitably amended according to local or changing conditions by
process simpler than the normal one required for amending other parts of the statute. The
division of a statute into sections and Schedules is a mere matter of convenience and a
Schedule therefore may contain substantive enactment which may even go beyond the scope of
a section to which the Schedule may appear to be connected by its heading. In such a case, a
clear positive provision in a Schedule may be held to prevail over the prime facie indication
furnished by its heading and the purpose of the Schedule contained in the Act. However, if the
language is not so clear, the provision in the Schedule may be construed as confined to the
purpose indicated by its heading and the section in the statute to which it appears connected. In
case of conflict between the body of the Act and the Schedule the former prevails. Much
importance ordinarily is not given to the forms in the Schedule, as they are intended to suit the
generality of cases rather than all cases, and they give way to clear provisions of enactment.
But in case of doubtful words in the enactment a scheduled form may be utilized for the purpose
of throwing light on their meaning.
The Code of Civil Procedure consists of two parts, the first containing, sections called
the body of the Cody and the second containing orders in the schedules called the rules. The
body of the code contains provisions of substantive nature and lay down the general principles
and creates jurisdiction, while the orders contained in the schedule relate to procedure and
indicate the mode in which jurisdiction created by the body of the code has to be exercised. The
sections lay down the general principles, while the rules provide the means by which they can
be applied. If, however, the rules are inconsistent with the body of the Code, the latter would
prevail.
(xi) Illustrations :
Illustrations appended to a section form part of the statute and although forming no part
of the section, are of relevance and value in the construction of the text of the section and they
should not be readily rejected as repugnant to the section. But illustrations cannot have the
effect of modifying the language of the section and they cannot either curtail or expand the
ambit of the section which alone forms the enactment.
Illustrations in enactments provided by the legislature are valuable aids in understanding
the real scope of the text thereof. They are part of the statute. The illustrations, however, make
nothing law which would not be law without them. They only exhibit the law in full action. It has
been held in Shambhu Nath Mehra Vs. The State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SCR 199, that an
illustration does not exhaust the full control of the section which it illustrates and equally it can
neither curtail nor expand its ambit.
Although illustrations are to be accepted as being relevant and valuable for the
construction of the section, they merely exemplify the application of the rule contained in the
section. They do not have the effect of modifying or extending the language of the section which
alone form the enactment. It ought never be allowed to defeat, control or restrict the plain
meaning of the section itself and certainly it ought not to do so when the effect would be to
curtail the right when the section in its ordinary sense would confer. An illustration ordinarily
exemplifies the particular section to which it is appended, and the court cannot import into it an
illustration to one section, which is applicable to a particular matter, a subsequent proposition of
law or a rule of construction embodied in another section which is not so applicable.
(xii) Meaning of the words :
All parts of a statute must be construed together so as to avoid inconsistencies and
conflicts between various provisions contained in it. To ascertain the meaning of a section, it is
not permissible to omit any part of it, the whole section should be read together and an attempt
should be made to reconcile both the parts.
Where the court is dealing with the subsections of a section, it is necessary that the two
sub-sections must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be on the rest.
The two sub-sections must be read as part of an integral whole and being inter-dependent. An
attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them, if it is reasonably possible to do
so, and to avoid repugnancy. If repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may
arise as to which of the two should prevail. But this question can arise only if repugnancy cannot
be avoided.
Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other
clauses in the statute so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statue. No part of a
statute should be construed in isolation for the reason that the intention of the law-makers is to
be found not in one part of the statute or another but in the entire enactment and the contention
can be best gathered by viewing a particular part of the statute not detached from its context in
the statute but in connection with its whole context.
(xiii) Non-obstante clause :
The expression “Non-obstante” means notwithstanding. Sometimes a section
commences with the clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any
other law for the time being. And, in case of conflict, the idea is to give the enacting or operative
part of the section an overriding effect over the provisions of the Act found in the non-obstante
clause. The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-
obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously. But the non-obstante clause need
not necessarily and always be co-extensive with the operative part so as to have the effect of
cutting down the clear terms of an enactment and if the words of the enactment are clear and
are capable of a clear interpretation on a plain grammatical construction of the words, the non-
obstante clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation.
