INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute and
to act upon the true intention of the legislature. The most common rule of interpretation is that
every part of the statute must be understood in a harmonious manner by reading and construing
every part of it together. A statute is to be construed according to the intention of its maker. The
maxim “A Verbis legis non est recedendum” means that you must not vary the words of the
statute while interpreting it. The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention
of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. If a statutory provision
is open to more than one interpretation, the Court has to choose that interpretation which
represents the true intention of the legislature. The function of the court is only to expound and
not to legislate. The correct interpretation is one that best harmonizes the words with the object
of the statute. A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court
should be to secure that object. A construction which reduces the legislation to futility should
1. LITERAL INTERPRETATION :
It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is
clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be
the consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme
law making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has
been called the safest rule because the legislature’s intention can be deduced only from the
language through which it has expressed itself. The bare words of the Act must be construed to
get the meaning of the statute and one need not probe into the intention of the legislature. The
elementary rule of construction is that the language must be construed in its grammatical and
literal sense and hence it is termed as litera legis or litera script.
The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning. This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation. Natural
and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from unless it can be shown that the
legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning.
In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd, it was held that according to the
fundamental principles of construction, the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by
chapter, section by section and then word by word.
In Jugal Kishore Saraf vs. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376, it was observed: “The
cardinal rules of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the
words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such reading leads to
absurdity and the words are susceptible of author meaning, the court may adopt the same. But
if no such alternative construction is possible the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal
In determining the meaning of any word or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in a
statute, the first question to be asked is – “What is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word
or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which
cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the Legislature, that it is proper to
look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase”. The context, as already seen, in
the construction of statutes, means the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other
statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to
In a case before the Supreme Court, the question was as to the meaning of the word
‘vegetables’ as it occurred in the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of
1948, whether it included betel leaves or not. Although the word in natural history and
according to dictionary meaning is comprehensive enough to include betel leave, the Supreme
Court held that “being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense,
meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is
dealing would attribute to it” and so the word was construed to denote those classes of
vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens. It was, therefore, held that betel leaves
and sugarcane were excluded from its purview.
The Supreme Court “has consistently taken the view that, in determining the meaning or
connotation of words and expressions describing an article in a tariff Schedule, one principle
which is fairly well settled is that those words and expressions should be construed in the sense
in which they are understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer. The reason is that it
is they who are concerned with it, and, it is the sense in which they understand it which
constitutes the definitive index of legislative intention.
When a word has acquired a special connotation in law, dictionaries cease to be helpful
in interpreting that word.
The words, ‘Judgment’ and ‘Final Order’ have acquired a technical meaning. ‘Judgment’
means “the declaration or final determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought
before the Court” and ‘Final Order’ means “an order which finally determines the rights of the
parties and brings the case to end”.
If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction
which validates the object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting. It is better to
validate a thing than to invalidate it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of
construction is to ascertain the intention of the parliament.
THE MISCHIEF RULE :
When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most
firmly established rule for construction of such words “of all statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)” is the rule laid down in Haydon’s case
which has “now attained the status of a classic. The rule, which is also known as ‘purposive
construction’ or mischief rule, enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act.
The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which ‘shall suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy”.
The Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832 expressed the view that
the rule in Heydon’s case is applicable only when the words in question are ambiguous and are
reasonably capable of more than one meaning.
But it has already been seen that for deciding whether the language used by the
Legislature is plain or ambiguous it has to be studied in its context, and ‘context’ embraces
previous state of the law and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy. Therefore,
it is not really correct to say that the rule in Heydon’s case is not applicable when the language
is not ambiguous. The correct principle is that after the words have been construed in their
context and it is found that the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in
Heydon’s case ceases to be controlling and gives way to the plain meaning rule.
If the language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting the
true meaning regard must be had to be consequences resulting from adopting the alternative
constructions. A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice,
absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system
which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that
construction which avoids such results. This rule has no application when the words are
susceptible to only one meaning and no alternative construction is reasonably open.
It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute and
to act upon the true intention of the legislature. The most common rule of interpretation is that
every part of the statute must be understood in a harmonious manner by reading and construing
every part of it together. A statute is to be construed according to the intention of its maker. The
maxim “A Verbis legis non est recedendum” means that you must not vary the words of the
statute while interpreting it. The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention
of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. If a statutory provision
is open to more than one interpretation, the Court has to choose that interpretation which
represents the true intention of the legislature. The function of the court is only to expound and
not to legislate. The correct interpretation is one that best harmonizes the words with the object
of the statute. A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court
should be to secure that object. A construction which reduces the legislation to futility should
1. LITERAL INTERPRETATION :
It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is
clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be
the consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme
law making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has
been called the safest rule because the legislature’s intention can be deduced only from the
language through which it has expressed itself. The bare words of the Act must be construed to
get the meaning of the statute and one need not probe into the intention of the legislature. The
elementary rule of construction is that the language must be construed in its grammatical and
literal sense and hence it is termed as litera legis or litera script.
The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning. This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation. Natural
and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from unless it can be shown that the
legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning.
In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd, it was held that according to the
fundamental principles of construction, the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by
chapter, section by section and then word by word.
In Jugal Kishore Saraf vs. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376, it was observed: “The
cardinal rules of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the
words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such reading leads to
absurdity and the words are susceptible of author meaning, the court may adopt the same. But
if no such alternative construction is possible the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal
In determining the meaning of any word or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in a
statute, the first question to be asked is – “What is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word
or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads to some result which
cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the Legislature, that it is proper to
look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase”. The context, as already seen, in
the construction of statutes, means the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other
statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to
In a case before the Supreme Court, the question was as to the meaning of the word
‘vegetables’ as it occurred in the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of
1948, whether it included betel leaves or not. Although the word in natural history and
according to dictionary meaning is comprehensive enough to include betel leave, the Supreme
Court held that “being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense,
meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is
dealing would attribute to it” and so the word was construed to denote those classes of
vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens. It was, therefore, held that betel leaves
and sugarcane were excluded from its purview.
The Supreme Court “has consistently taken the view that, in determining the meaning or
connotation of words and expressions describing an article in a tariff Schedule, one principle
which is fairly well settled is that those words and expressions should be construed in the sense
in which they are understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer. The reason is that it
is they who are concerned with it, and, it is the sense in which they understand it which
constitutes the definitive index of legislative intention.
When a word has acquired a special connotation in law, dictionaries cease to be helpful
in interpreting that word.
The words, ‘Judgment’ and ‘Final Order’ have acquired a technical meaning. ‘Judgment’
means “the declaration or final determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought
before the Court” and ‘Final Order’ means “an order which finally determines the rights of the
parties and brings the case to end”.
If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction
which validates the object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting. It is better to
validate a thing than to invalidate it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of
construction is to ascertain the intention of the parliament.
THE MISCHIEF RULE :
When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most
firmly established rule for construction of such words “of all statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)” is the rule laid down in Haydon’s case
which has “now attained the status of a classic. The rule, which is also known as ‘purposive
construction’ or mischief rule, enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act.
The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which ‘shall suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy”.
The Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832 expressed the view that
the rule in Heydon’s case is applicable only when the words in question are ambiguous and are
reasonably capable of more than one meaning.
But it has already been seen that for deciding whether the language used by the
Legislature is plain or ambiguous it has to be studied in its context, and ‘context’ embraces
previous state of the law and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy. Therefore,
it is not really correct to say that the rule in Heydon’s case is not applicable when the language
is not ambiguous. The correct principle is that after the words have been construed in their
context and it is found that the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in
Heydon’s case ceases to be controlling and gives way to the plain meaning rule.
If the language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting the
true meaning regard must be had to be consequences resulting from adopting the alternative
constructions. A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice,
absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system
which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that
construction which avoids such results. This rule has no application when the words are
susceptible to only one meaning and no alternative construction is reasonably open.
