STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES :
The general rule for the construction of a penal statute is that it would be strictly
interpreted, that is, if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal
provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty
rather than the one which imposes a penalty.
A penal statute has to be construed narrowly in favour of the person proceeded against.
This rule implies a preference for the liberty of the subject, in case of ambiguity in the language
of the provision. The courts invariably follow the principle of strict construction in penal statutes.
In constructing a penal Act, if a reasonable interpretation in a particular case can avoid the
penalty the Court adopts that construction.
It is well settled that a penal statute must be strictly construed, that is to say, in the
absence of clear compelling language, the provision should not be given a wider interpretation
and “no cause should be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable
interpretation of the statute. If two conditions are possible on the language of the statute, the
court must choose the one which is consistent with good sense and fairness, and eschew the
other which makes its operation unduly oppressive or unreasonable or which would lead to
change, inconsistent results or otherwise introduce an element of bewildering uncertainty and
practical inconvenience in the working of the statute.
Normal rule in the construction of a penal statute is that if there is any ambiguity in the
language and a doubt arises as to whether a particular Act falls within the statutory provision or
not, the court should always interpret the words in favour of the accused.
The rule of strict construction of penal statutes is justified on the ground that the
enormous growth of penal laws in the present time may not become traps for honest and
unwary men through strict construction of a penal statute, which limits its operation to the clear
meaning of the language and excludes uncertainty in its application, injustice can be avoided.
There are some exceptions to the general rule of construction of penal statues: (1)
wherever the intention of the legislature is clear and it is found that by a narrower construction,
would lead to frustration of the very purpose of the statute, then there would be no objection that
a wide construction be given to the words, in accordance with the legislative intent; (2) when the
purpose is to remove a defect and achieve a certain object, the courts should not hesitate to
give a wide meaning to the words of a penal statute.
The rule of strict construction does not also prevent the court in interpreting a statute
according to its current meaning and applying the language to cover developments in science
and technology not known at the time of passing of the statute.
The ultimate object of construction either of a penal or of any other statute is to ascertain
the legislative intent. The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to
have their full meaning if that would effectuate the intention. The words as used in a penal
statue are taken in a wider sense than their etymological denotation may permit or meaning
which is colloquially or popularly attached to them. This is necessary to carry out the legislative
1. Mens rea in statutory offences:
Existence of a guilty intent is an essential ingredient of a crime at common law and the
principle is expressed in the maxim – actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The legislature
may, however, create an offence of strict liability where mens rea is wholly or partly not
necessary. Such a measure is resorted to in public interest and moral justification of laws of
strict liability. When a statute creates an offence, the question whether the offence involves the
existence of mens rea as an essential element of it or whether the statute dispenses with it and
creates strict liability are questions which have to be answered on a true construction of the
statute. The courts, however, regard it as a fundamental principle that an offence cannot be
made out without the existence of mens rea, unless from a consideration of the terms of the
statute and other relevant circumstances it clearly appears that that must have been the
intention of Parliament.
Offences in respect of which mens rea is not required to be established are usually of a
comparatively minor character and sentences prescribed for them are not of a severe type.
Therefore, the provision of a sentence of imprisonment or any other severe penalty may prima
facie indicate the mens rea, as a constituent part of the crime, was not intended to be excluded.
But it is not uncommon to find statutes concerning public health, safety and morals to provide
severe penalties for offences of strict liability.
Absence of the word ‘knowingly’ or some such other word expressing a guilty intention in
the relevant section of the statute and its presence in other sections or in other part of the same
section is not in itself conclusive to indicate that a guilty intention is excluded. But it is certainly a
material consideration and may in a proper case taken along with other relevant fact so to rebut
the presumption of existence of mens rea.
It has already been noticed that in applying the rule of construction under discussion,
regard must be had to the words of the statue and to the subject matter with which it deals. It is
pertinent also to enquire whether putting the defendant under strict liability will assist in the
enforcement of the statue, and where it can be shown that the imposition of strict liability would
result in the prosecution and conviction of a class of persons whose conduct could not in any
way affect the observance of the law, even where the statute is dealing with a grave social evil
strict liability is not likely to be intended.
The Supreme Court in Kalpnath Rai Vs. State, AIR 1998 SC 201, considered section
3(4) of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. This section enacts that
‘whoever harbours – any terrorist’ shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall not be less
than five years but which may extent to imprisonment for life. The court held that the section
provided for harsh punishment could not be held to have excluded mens rea; and a person
giving shelter to a terrorist without knowing that he was a terrorist could not be punished under
section 3(4).
Prohibitory laws are enforced if the statute required the offenders violating the law
whether knowingly or unknowingly must be brought to book. The statutes regulating particular
activities for public welfare like sale of food, drinks out the presumption of mens rea, as it has
been frequently inferred that the legislature intends such activities to be carried out under
conditions of strict liability.
The intention of legislature as evident from the language of the prevention of Food
Adulteration Act is to provide for strict liability. Therefore, every person selling adulterated food
commits an offence under this Act whether he had the guilty intention or not.
2. Vicarious liability in statutory offences :
The general presumption is that the master is not criminally liable for any act committed
by the servant, unless the legislature prohibits the act and imposes an absolute duty. The
general rule is that ‘criminal liability in a matter that might result either as a principal or as an
accessory springs from the authorization and not simply from the relationship of a master and
servant.
While prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his
servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the
prohibition or the duty absolute; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by
his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not, regard
must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the
person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be
performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed. It may also be that the statutory
provision is so drafted that it only makes the employer liable for the offence but does not make
the employee liable for whose act or default the employer is made liable. Further, where the
nature of the activity makes the premises, where it is carried on, a major hazard site, Parliament
may impose upon the employer a duty, failure of which makes him liable for a criminal offence,
‘to conduct his undertaken in such a way’ that subject to reasonable practicability, it did not
create risks to people’s health and safety and the employer may become liable for the offence
irrespective of the question that the risk originated not because of some lapse of his employee
but because of the lapse of some other person over whom he had no control. In such cases the
statute makes the employer liable for the offence, though he has personally no mens rea or has
not committed any actus reus, as the duty is laid on the employer himself by reference to a
certain kind of activity carried on by him. This duty is conceptually entirely different from the
vicarious liability for the tortuous acts of his servants and agents.
