PRESUMPTION REGARDING JURISDICTION :
There is a strong presumption that a statute should not be given such an interpretation
as takes away the jurisdiction of the courts unless the language of the statute unambiguously so
states. The presumption is that since the legislature ordinarily does not intend that justice should
be out of bounds for the subjects, the courts must be presumed to have jurisdiction unless the
legislature by clear words or by clear necessary implications have ousted jurisdiction.
Since jurisdiction is bestowed in a court by legislation, legislation alone can take away
the same. The parties to a dispute can neither create by mutual consent jurisdiction of a court to
try their dispute nor can they take it away by mutual consent if in fact a court is vested with
jurisdiction in the matter. Mutual consent of parties, however, can create an arbitrator and the
arbitrator may be a judge also.
There is a strong presumption that civil courts have jurisdiction to decide all questions of
civil nature. The exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts is therefore not to be readily inferred and
such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is a principle by no
means to be whittled down and has been referred to as a fundamental rule. As a necessary
corollary of this rule, provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts and provisions conferring
jurisdiction on authorities and tribunals other than civil courts are strictly construed. The rule that
the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts is not to be readily inferred is based on the theory that
civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and the people have a right, unless expressly or
implicitly debarred, to insist for free access to the courts of general jurisdiction of the State.
Indeed, the principle is not limited to civil courts alone, but applies to all courts of general
jurisdiction including criminal courts. Exclusion of jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts can be
brought about by setting up courts of limited jurisdiction in respect of the limited field, only if the
vesting and the exercise of that limited jurisdiction is clear and operative and there is an
adequate machinery for the exercise of the limited jurisdiction. But the rule against exclusion of
jurisdiction of courts like other rules of construction is attached only where two or more
reasonably possible construction are open on the language of the statute and not where the
legislative intent is plain and manifest to oust the jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court stated that the first and the primary rule of construction is that the
intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the word
used are capable of one construction only then it would not been open for the courts to adopt
any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such a construction is more consistent
with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the
statue must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words
are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy, or object of the
Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of
which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other is likely to assist the
achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is
only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the Act
purposes, to remedy and correct.
The superior court can in a proper case exercise its jurisdiction even in favour of a
petitioner who has allowed the time to appeal to expire or has not perfected his appeal, for
example, by furnishing security required by the statute, when an inferior court or tribunal by
discarding all principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrived at a
conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fairly or the inferior court or tribunal acts
wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has held the jurisdiction of the Court was not excluded and laid
down the following principles :
1. Where the state gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals the jurisdiction
of the civil court must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil
courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases
where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal
has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
2. Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of
the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided
may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court, where there is no
express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find
out the amendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the
latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides
for the determination of the right or the liability and further lays down that all questions about the
said right and liability shall be determined by tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies
normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.
3. Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought
before the tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question
on a revision or reference from the decision of the tribunals.
4. Where a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of
any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for
refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, but it is not a
compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
5. Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in
excess of the constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies.
6. Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionalties
are the decisions of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are
declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act in either case, the
scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant inquiry.
7. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred unless
the conditions above set down apply.
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also furnishes an example of an Act which creates
new rights and obligations and provides machinery for adjudication of disputes pertaining to
them. The Supreme Court has held that if an industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a
right or an obligation created under the Act then the only remedy available to the suit is to get an
adjudication under the Act. This case was followed in holding that for wrongs created by the Act
the only remedy is what is provided in the Act.
